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Introduction 
Despite the ubiquitous reference to the concept of social norms in the 
social sciences, there is no consensus about the power of social norms 
to direct human action. For some, norms have a central and regular 
influence on human behavior, while for others, the concept is too vague, 
and the evidence we have about norm compliance is too contradictory to 
support the claim that they appreciably affect behavior. Those who doubt 
that norms have a behavior-guiding force argue that human behavior 
only occasionally conforms with the dominant social. norms. If the same 
norms are in place when behavior is norm-consisterit as when it is norm 
inconsistent, why should we believe that norms mediated any of it? 
Much of the discussion about the power norms have to affect behavior 
arises from a confusion about what is meant by 'norm.' A norm can be 
formal()r informal, personal or collective, descriptive of what most people 
do, or prescriptive of behavior. In the same social setting, conformity to 
these different kinds of norms stems from a variety of motivations and 
produces distinct, sometimes even opposing, behavioral patterns. Take 
for example a culture in which many individuals have strong personal 
norms that prohibit corrupt practices and in which there are legal norms 
against bribing public officers, yet bribing is widespread and tolerated. 
Suppose we were able to independently assess whether an individual has 
' a personal norm against corruption. Can we predict whether a person, 
who we'know condemns corruption, will bribe a public officer when given 
a chance? Probably not, but we could come closer to a good prediction 
if we knew certain factors and cues are present in this situation and have 
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an influence on the decision. The theories of norms we have inherited, 
mainly from sociology, offer little help, because they did not develop 
an understanding of the conditions under which individuals are likely to 
follow a norm or, when several norms may apply, what makes one of them 
focal. 
A first step in the direction of a deeper understanding of what moti-
vates us to follow a norm is to clarify what we mean by a social norm. 
'Norm' is a term used to refer to a variety of behaviors, and accompa-
nying expectations. These should not be lumped together, on pain of 
missing some important features that are of great help in understanding 
phenomena such as variance in norm compliance. Inconsistent confor-
mity, for example, is to be expected with certain types of norms, but not 
with others. In this chapter I put forth a 'constructivist' theory of norms, 
one that explains norms in terms of the expectations and preferences 
of those who follow them. My view is that the very existence of a social 
norm depends on a sufficient number of people believing that it exists 
and pertains to a given type of situation, and expecting that enough other 
people are following it in those kinds of situations. Given the right kind 
of expectations, people will have conditional preferences for obeying a 
norm, meaning that preferences will be conditional on having expec-
tations about other people's conformity. Such expectations and prefer-
ences will result in collective behaviors that further confirm the existence 
of the norm in the eyes of its followers. 
Expectations and conditional preferences are the building blocks of 
several social constructs, though, not just social norms. Descriptive norms 
such as fashions and fads are also based on expectations of conformity 
and conditional preferences, and so are conventions, such as signaling sys-
tems, rules of etiquette, and traffic rules. In both cases, the preference 
for conformity does not clash with self-interest, especially if we define it 
in purely material terms.l One can model descriptive norms and con-
ventions as solutions to coordination games. Such games capture the 
structure of situations where there exist several possible equilibria and, 
although we might like one of them best, what we most want is to coor-
dinate with others on any equilibrium; hence we act in conformity to 
' what we expect others to do. Descriptive norms and conventions are thus 
representable as equilibria of original coordination games. Social norms,· 
on the contrary, often go against narrow self-interest, as when we are 
1 What one most prefers in these cases is to 'do as others do,' or to coordinate with others' 
choices. 
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required to cooperate, reciprocate, act fairly, or do anything that may 
involve some material cost or the forgoing of some benefit. The kinds of 
problems that social norms are meant to solve differ from the coordina-
tion problems that conventions and descriptive norms 'solve.' We need 
ocialnorms in all those situations in which there is conflict of interest 
s - -· 
but also a potential for joint gain. The games that social norms solve are 
called mixed-motive games. 2 Such mixed-motive games are not games 
of coordination to start with, but social norms, as I shall argue, transform 
mixed-motive games into coordination ones. This transformation, how-
ever, hinges on each individual expecting enough other people to follow 
the norm, too. If this expectation is violated, an individual will revert to 
playing the original game and to behaving 'selfishly.' This chapter thus 
starts with a precise definition of social norms and only later considers 
what differentiates such norms from descriptive norms and conventions. 
Because all three are based on expectations and conditional preferences, 
I pay special attention to the nature of expectations (empirical and/or 
normative) that support each construct. 
The definition of social norm I am proposing should be taken as a 
rational reconstruction of what a social norm is, not a faithful descriptive 
account of the real beliefs and preferences people have or of the way in 
which they in fact deliberate. Such a reconstruction, however, will have 
to be reliable in that it must be possible to extract meaningful, testable 
predictions from it. This is one of the tasks I undertake in ChaRters 3 
and 4. An important claim I make in this chapter is that the belief/ desire 
model of choice that is the core of my rational reconstruction of social 
norms does not commit us to avow that we always engage in conscious 
deliberation to decide whether to follow a norm. We may follow a norm 
automatically and thoughtlessly and yet still be able to explain our action 
in terms of beliefs and desires. 
The simplistic, common view that we conform to norms either because 
of external sanctions or because they have been internalized flies in the 
face of much evidence that people sometimes obey norms even in the 
absence of any obvious incentive structure or personal commitment to 
what the norm stands for (Cialdini et al. 1990). Many who postulate inter-
nal or external incentives as the sole reasons for compliance also main-
tain compliance is the result of a conscious process of balancing costs 
2 Well-known examples of mixed-motive games that can be 'solved' (or better, 'trans-
formed') by norms of fairness, reciprocity, promise-keeping, etc., are the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, the Trust game, and Ultimatum games. 
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and benefits, culminating in a decision to conform or to transgress. 
Yet personal experience tells us that compliance is often automatic and 
unreflective: Even important social norms like those that regulate fair 
exchanges and reciprocation are often acted on without much thought 
to (or awareness of) their personal or social consequences. Whereas the 
literature on social norms has traditionally stressed the deliberational side 
of conformity, in this book I want to emphasize its automatic component. 
Both aspects are important, but too much emphasis on conscious delib-
eration may miss crucial links between decision heuristics and norms, as 
I explain in this chapter and the next. 
Whenever we enter any environment, we have to decide how to behave. 
There are two ways to reach a decision. One is somewhat ideally depicted 
by the traditional rational choice model: We may systematically assess the 
situation, gather information, list and evaluate the possible consequences 
of different actions, assess the probability of each consequence occurring, 
and then calculate the expected utility of the alternative courses of action 
and choose one that maximizes our expected utility. I dub this the deliber-
ational route to behavior. The process of rational deliberation ending in 
the choice of a course of action is likely to be costly in time, resources, and 
effort and to require considerable skill. The deliberational way to behav-
ior is likely to be chosen when one is held accountable for one's choice; 
when the consequences may be particularly important and long-lasting; 
or when one has the time, knowledge, and disposition to ponder over 
alternative choices. But even in these cases deliberation may fall short 
of the ideal. Behavioral decision theorists have gathered compelling evi-
dence that actors systematically violate the assumptions of rational choice 
theory (Camerer 2003). Thus the deliberational way need not assume 
perfect rationality. It only requires conscious deliberation and balanc-
ing of what one perceives (or misperceives) as the costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of action. On occasion we do engage in conscious 
deliberation, even if the process is marred by mistakes of judgment and 
calculation. 
A second way to reach a decision relies on following behavioral rules 
that prescribe a particular course of action for the situation (or a class of 
similar situations). These guides to behavior include habits, roles, and, of 
course, norms. Once one adopts a behavioral rule, one follows it without . 
the conscious and systematic assessment of the situation performed in 
deliberation. The question of how a particular behavioral rule is primed 
is of great interest. The answer is likely to lie in the interplay of (external) 
situational cues and (internal) categorization processes. These processes 
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lie beyond awareness and probablyoccur in split seconds. Models of men-
tal processes (Lamberts and Shanks 1997) suggest that, when faced with 
a new situation, we immediately search for cues about how to interpret it 
or what is appropriate behavior for that situation. It is conjectured that 
we compare the siJ~ation. we face with others we remember that possess 
similar characteristics, and that this comparison activates behavior that 
is considered most "normal" for this type of situation. The comparison 
process is one of 'categorization,' of finding relevant similarities between 
the current context and other ones we have experienced in the past. To 
efficiently search our memory and group a new event with previously 
encountered ones, we use cognitive shortcuts. Cognitive shortcuts play 
a crucial role in categorization and the subsequent activation of scripts 
and schemata. 3 Consequently, they are responsible for some norms rather 
than others being activated in different situations. Let us call this route 
to behavior the heuristic route. In the heuristic route, behavior is guided 
by default rules stored in memory that are cued by contextual stimuli. 
Norms are one class of default rules. According to the heuristic route, 
norm compliance .is an automatic response to situational cues that focus 
our attention on a particular norm, rather than a conscious decision to 
give priority to normative considerations. On the heuristic view, norms are 
context-dependent, meaning that different social norms will be activ<;J.ted, 
or appear appropriate, depending on how a situation is understood. In 
turn, our understanding of a situation is influenced by which previous 
contexts we view as similar to the present one, and this process of assess~ 
ing similarities and 'fitting' a situation into ·a pre-existing category will 
make specific norms salient. I spell out in detail the process of drawing 
social inferences and categorizing in the next chapter. 
The distinction between deliberational and heuristic routes to behav-
ior is a useful simplification, and it should be taken as such. The truth is 
that we often combine the two routes, and what is a staple of the heuris-
tic process can also be an object of deliberation. Conformity to a norm, 
for example, is not always an automatic, nondeliberational affair. Espe-
cially when we are tempted to shirk an obligation, the thought of the 
personal and social consequences of alternative courses of action is often 
present and important in determining our choice. I want to stress, again, 
that deliberation is not synonymous with 'rational deliberation', in part 
3 Schemata are cognitive structures that contain knowledge about people, events, roles, 
etc. Schemata for events (e.g., a lecture, going to a restaurant, playing a chess game) are 
also call~d scripts. Chapter 2 further elaborates on the roles of scripts and schemata. 
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because the list of possible mistakes and cognitive impairments with which 
our decision processes are fraught is potentially very long. Rational deliber-
ation is better conceived of as an ideal type, against which we measure the 
amplitude of our deviations. What is important in deliberation is the con-
scious processing of information and evaluation of options. Whether ide-
ally or less than ideally rational, deliberation refers to beliefs and desires 
of which we are aware: Deliberation is the process of consciously choosing 
what we most desire according to our beliefs. In the deliberational view, 
beliefs and desires (preferences) are treated as mental states of which we 
are conscious, at least in the course of deciding which action to take. 
The problem with taking beliefs and desires to be conscious mental 
states is that they can then play no role in the heuristic route to behavior. 
There is, however, a long and reputable philosophical tradition that takes 
beliefs and desires to be dispositions to act in a certain way in the appro-
priate circumstance. According to the dispositional account, to say that 
someone has a belief or a preference implies that we expect such motives 
to manifest themselves in the relevant circumstances. Thus, for example, 
one might automatically obey a norm of truth-telling without thinking 
of the beliefs and preferences that underlie one's behavior. These beliefs 
and preferences might become manifest only when they happen to be 
unfulfilled. To assess the nature of such beliefs and desires, all we need 
is a simple counterfactual exercise. Suppose we ask someone if he would 
keep telling the truth (as he normally and almost automatically does) 
in a world where he came to realize that people systematically lie. Our 
subject may answer in a variety of ways, but whatever course of action he 
claims he would choose, it is likely that he never thought of it before. 
He did not know, for example, that he would be ready to become a liar 
until he was put in the condition to reflect on it. Our subject may rea-
son that it would be stupid on his part to keep telling the truth, as it 
would put him at an obvious disadvantage. Evidently his preference for 
sincerity is conditional on expecting reciprocity. If these expectations 
were not met, his preference would be different. Note that dispositions 
need not be stable: Preferences, for example, can be context-dependent, 
in the sense that even a small change of context may elicit different, 
even opposite, preferences. The research on framing effects shows just 
that (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). The heuristic way to behavior seems· 
perfectly compatible with a dispositional account of beliefs and desires. 
Namely, the default rules that we tend to automatically follow are accom-
panied and supported by beliefs and desires that we become aware of 
only when they are challenged. Surprise in this case breeds awareness of 
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our underlying motives. Moreover, whenever a norm is 'cued' or made 
salient in a particular environment, the mechanism that primes it elic-
its the beliefs and preferences that support that particular norm. The 
remainder of this chapter presents a taxonomy of norms that relies on 
prefe-rences and b_(!_lj_ef.s '!§.:building blocks.' 
The idea that social norms may be cued, and hence manipulated, is 
attractive. It suggests that we may be able to induce pro-social behavior 
and maintain social order at low cost. Norms differ in different cultures, 
and what cues a Westerner into cooperation will probably differ from what 
cues a Mapuche Indian (Henrich 2000). In both cases, however, it may 
be possible to structure the environment in a way that produces desirable 
behavior. If you sail along the Italian coast, you will notice large beach 
posters that invite sailors not to litter and pollute "your" sea. In Sweden, 
instead, environmentalist appeals always refer to "our" environment. The 
individualistic Italians are seemingly thought to be more responsive to 
an invitation to protect a "private" good, whereas Swedes are expected 
to be sensitive to pleas for the common good. Knowing what makes peo-
ple focus on the environment in a positive way can be a powerful tool 
in the hands of shrewd policymakers. Still, developing successful poli-
cies that rely on social norms presents several difficulties. To successfully 
manipulate social settings, we need to predict how people will interpret 
a given context, which cues will 'stand out' as salient, and how particu-
lar cues relate to certain norms. When multiple conflicting norms could 
apply, we should be able to tell which cues will favor one of them. Many 
norms are not socially beneficial, and once established they are difficult 
to eliminate. If we know what induces people to conform to "anti-social" 
norms, we may have a chance to curb destructive behavior. Without a bet-
ter understanding of the mechanisms through which norms control our 
actions, however, there is little hope of predicting and thus influencing 
behavior. The mechanisms that induce conformity are very different for 
different kinds of norms. Consequently, a good understanding of their 
diversity will prevent us from focusing on the wrorig type of norm in our 
efforts to induce pro-social behavior. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce the reader to my 
definition of social norms, descriptive norms, conventions, and the con-
ditions under which one might see individuals following any of these. I 
shall especially focus on the four (individually) necessary and (jointly) 
sufficient conditions for a social norm to exist that I develop in the follow-
ing pages: contingency, empirical expectations, normative expectations, 
and conditignal preferences. 
•. 
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Social Norms 
Social norms are frequently confused with codified rules, normative 
expectations, or recurrent, observable behavior. However, there are sig-
nificant problems with such definitions of social norms. By the term social 
norm, I shall always refer to informal norms, as opposed to formal, codi-
fied norms such as legal rules. Social norms are, like legal ones, public and 
shared, but, unlike legal rules, which are supported by formal sanctions, 
social norms may not be enforced at all. When they are enforced, the sanc-
tions are informal, as when the violation of a group norm brings about 
responses that range from gossip to open censure, ostracism, or dishonor 
for the transgressor. Some such norms may become part of our system 
ofvalues, and we may feel a strong obligation to obey them. Guilt and 
remorse will accompany transgression, as much as the breach of a moral 
rule elicits painfully negative feelings in the offender. Social norms should 
also be distinguished from moral rules: As I shall argue in the following, 
expectations are crucial in sustaining the former but not necessarily the 
latter. In particular, conformity to a social norm is conditional on expec-
tations about other people's behavior and/ or beliefs. The feelings of 
shame and guilt that may accompany a transgression merely reinforce 
one's tendency to conform, but they are never the sole or the ultimate 
determinants of conformity. I will come back to this point later. 
A norm cannot be simply identified with a recurrent, collective behav-
ioral pattern. For one, norms can be either prescriptive or proscriptive: 
In the latter case, we usually do not observe the proscribed behavior. As 
anyone who has lived in a foreign country knows, learning proscriptive 
norms can be difficult and the learning process slow and fraught with mis-
understandings and false steps. Often the legal system helps, in that many 
proscriptive norms are made explicit and supported by laws, but a host of 
socially relevant proscriptions such as "do not stare at someone you pass 
by" or "do not touch people you are not intimate with when you talk to 
them" are not codified and can only be learned by trial and error. In most 
cases in which a proscriptive norm is in place, we do not observe the behav-
ior proscribed by the norm, and it is impossible to determine whether 
the absence of certain behaviors is due to a proscription or to something 
else, unless we assess people's beliefs and expectations. Furthermore, if· 
we were to adopt a purely behavioral account of norms, nothing would 
distinguish shared fairness criteria from, say, the collective morning habit 
of brushing one's teeth. It would also be difficult to deal with those cases 
in which people pay lip service to the norm in public and deviate in 
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private. Avoiding a purely behavioral account means focusing on the 
role expectations play in supporting those kinds of collective behaviors 
that we take to be norm-driven. After all, I brush my teeth whether or not 
1 expect others to do the same, but I would not even try to ask for a salary 
proportionate to my_educ,:ation if I expected my co-workers to go by the 
rule of giving to each in proportion to seniority. There are also behaviors 
that can be explained only by the existence of norms, even if the behav-
ior prescribed by the norm in question is never observed. In his study 
of the lk, Turnbull (1972) reports that these starved hunter-gatherers 
tried hard to elude situations where their compliance with norms of reci-
procity was expected. Thus they would go out of their way to avoid being 
in the role of gift-taker. A leaking roof would be repaired at night, so as to 
ward off offers to help and future obligations to repay the favor. Hunting 
was a solitary and furtive activity, so as to escape the obligation to share 
one's bounty with anyone encountered along the way. Much of the lk's 
behavior can be explained as a successful attempt at eluding existing reci-
procity norms. The Ik seemed to have collective beliefs about what sort 
of behavior was prescribed/proscribed in a given social context but acted 
in ways that prevented the underlying norms from being activated. Their 
practices demonstrate that it is not necessary to observe compliance to 
argue that a norm exists and affects behavior. 
As Turnbull's example shows, having normative beliefs and expecting 
others to conform to a norm do not always result in a norm being acti-
vated. Nobody is violating the norm, but everybody is trying to avoid situ-
ations where they would have to follow it. Thus, simply focusing on norms 
as clusters of expectations might be as misleading as focusing only on the 
behavioral dimension, because there are many examples of discrepancies 
between normative expectations and behavior. Take the widely acknowl-
edged norm of self-interest (Miller and Ratner 1998): It is remarkable to 
observe how often people (especially in the United States) expect others 
to ac:;t selfishly, even when they are prepared to act altruistically them-
selves. Studies show that people's willingness to give blood is not altered 
by monetary incentives, but typically those very people who are willing to 
donate blood for free expect others to donate blood only in the presence 
of a sufficient monetary reward (Wuthnow 1991). Similarly, when asked 
whether they would rent an apartment to an unmarried couple, all land-
lords interviewed in Oregon in the early 1970s answered positively, but 
they estimated that only 50% of other landlords would accept an unmar-
ried couple as tenants (Dawes 1972). Such cases are rather common; 
what is puzzling is that peQple may expect a given norm to be upheld 
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in the absence of information about other people's conforming behav-
ior and in the face of personal evidence to the contrary. Thus, simply 
focusing on people's expectations may tell us very little about collective 
behavior. 
If a purely behavioral definition of norms is deficient, and one solely 
based on expectations is questionable, what are we left with? Norms refer 
to behavior, to actions over which people have control, and are supported 
by shared expectations about what should/should not be done in differ-
ent types of social situations. Norms, however, cannot just be identified 
with observable behavior, nor can they be equated with normative beliefs, 
as normative beliefs may or may not result in appropriate actions. In 
what follows I introduce a definition of social norms that will be help-
ful in shedding light on the conceptual differences between different 
types of social rules. My definition coincides with ordinary usage in some 
respects but departs from that usage in others. Given the fact that the 
term has been put to multiple uses, it would be unrealistic to expect a 
single definition to agree with what each person using the term means. 
The goal of giving a specific definition is to single out what is fundamen-
tal to social norms, what differentiates them from other types of social 
constructs. 
Besides helping in drawing a taxonomy of social rules, a successful 
definition should provide conditions under which normative beliefs can 
be expected to be consistent with behavior. This means that those con-
ditions that are part of the definition of social norm would be used as 
premises in a practical argument whose conclusion is the decision to 
conform to a norm. This does not entail that we normally engage in 
such practical reasoning and deliberation and are consciously aware of 
our conforming choices. We should not confuse adopting a belief/ desire 
explanatory framework with assuming awareness of our own mental pro-
cesses. As I shall discuss in the last section, the fact that we are mostly 
unaware of our mental processes, and often are not fully conscious of what 
we are thinking and doing, is no objection to a belief/desire model of 
choice. 
The definition I am proposing should be taken as a rational reconstruc-
tion of what a social norm is, not a description of the real preferences and 
beliefs people have or the way in which they in fact deliberate (if at all). 
The advantage of a rational reconstruction is that it substitutes a precise 
concept for an imprecise one, thus removing the conceptual difficulties 
and vagueness related to everyday usage. A rational reconstruction of 
the concept of norm specifies in which sense one may say that norms 
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are rational, or compliance with a norm is rationa1.4 Not every rational 
reconstruction will do, though. For example, a rational reconstruction 
that is built on a belief/ desire structure is constrained by the requirement 
that, were beliefs to be different (in a specified sense), we would expect 
beh;:tvior to· change in predictable ways. In other words, a successful 
rational reconstruction must allow meaningful, interesting predictions 
to be made. 
Conditions for a Social Norm to Exist 
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where Scan be repre-
sented as a mixed-motive game. We say that R is a social norm in a pop-
ulation P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Per <; P such that, for 
each individual i E Per: 
Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of 
typeS; 
Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S 
on the condition that: 
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P 
conforms to R in situations of type S; 
and either 
(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P 
expects i to conform to R in situations of type S; 
or 
(b') Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently 
large subset of Pexpects ito conform toR in situations of type S, 
prefers i to conform, and may sanction behavior. 
A social norm R is followed by population P if there exists a sufficiently 
large subset P1 ~Per such that, for each individual i E Pp conditions 2(a) 
and either 2 (b) or 2 (b') are met for i and, as a result, i prefers to conform 
to R in situations of type S. 
There are several features of the above definition that need explana-
tion. First, note that a rule Rcan be a social norm for a population Peven 
if it is not currently being followed by P. I defined Per as the set of 'con-
ditional followers' of R, those individuals who know about Rand have a 
conditional preference for conforming toR. I defined Pr as the set of 'fol-
lowers' of R, those individuals who know about Rand have a preference 
4 E. Ullmann-Margalit (1977) made one of the first attempts at explaining norms and norm 
compliance in a rational choice framework. 
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for conforming to R (because they believe that the conditions for their 
conditional preference are fulfilled). A behavioral rule R is a social norm 
if the set of its conditional followers is sufficiently large; a social norm is 
followed if the set of its followers is sufficiently large. Second, note that a 
social norm is defined relative to a population: A behavioral rule R can 
be a social norm for one population P and not for another population 
P'. Finally, the 'sufficiently large subset Per of P'' clause reflects the fact 
that social norms need not be universally conditionally preferred or even 
universally known about in order to exist. A certain amount of oppor-
tunistic transgression is to be expected whenever a norm conflicts with 
individuals' self-interest. The 'sufficiently large subset Pr of Per' clause 
reflects the fact that, even among conditional followers of a norm, some 
individuals may not follow the norm because their empirical and nor-
mative expectations have not been fulfilled. Moreover, even among the 
members of Pr, occasional deviance due to mistakes is to be expected. 
How much deviance is tolerable is an empirical matter and may vary with 
different norms. For example, we would expect Per (the proportion of 
conditional followers) to be equal to Pin the case of group norms, espe-
cially when the group is fairly small, whereas Pct will be close toP in the 
case of well-entrenched social norms. For new norms, or norms that are 
not deemed to be socially important, the subset P cf could be significantly 
smaller than P. I will discuss deviance and its effects in later chapters, 
when I address the issue of norm dynamics. It should also be noted that 
I do ·not assume Pr (the proportion of actual followers) to be common 
knowledge. Different individuals will have different beliefs about the size 
of Pr and thus have different empirical expectations. If so, they will have 
different thresholds for what 'sufficiently large' means. What matters to 
actual conformity is that each individual in Pct believes that her threshold 
has been reached or surpassed. 
Condition 1, the contingency condition, says that actors are aware that a 
certain behavioral rule exists and applies to situations of type S. This col-
lective awareness is constitutive of its very existence as a norm. Note that 
norms are understood to apply to classes or families of situations, not 
to every possible situation or context. A norm of revenge, for example, 
usually applies to members of a kinship group and is suspended in case 
of proven accidental death. A norm of reciprocity may not be expected 
to apply if the gift was a bribe, and the rules that govern fair allocation of 
bodily organs differ from those that regulate the fair allocation ofuniver- . 
sity Ph.D. slots. Situational contingency explains why people sometimes 
try to manipulate norms by avoiding those situations to which the norm 
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applies (as the Ik did with food sharing and gift reciprocation) or by 
negotiating the meaning of a particular situation. 
Condition 2(a), the empirical expectations condition, says that expecta-
tions of conformity matter. I take them to be empirical expectations, in the 
sense that one expec~_people to follow R in situations of type S because 
one has observed them to do just that over a long period of time. If the 
present situation is of type S, one can reasonably infer that, ceteris paribus, 
people will conform to R as they always did in the past. Notice that the 
fulfillment of Condition 2(a) entails that a social norm is practiced (or is 
believed to be practiced) in a given population (which may be as small as 
a group comprising a few members or as large as a nation); otherwise 
there would not be empirical expectations. Sometimes expectations are 
formed not by directly observing conforming behavior, but rather its con-
sequences. This would happen, for example, with norms regulating pri-
vate behavior. In this case, public support might be voiced for a norm that 
is seldom adhered to in private. Q! conformity to such a norm is believed 
to produce observable consequences, then observing such consequences 
will validate the norm."$ut if these consequences are the effect of other 
causes, people will draJ the wrong inference and continue to believe that 
the norm is widely followed even when support is dwindling. Consider a 
norm of private behavior such as avoiding premarital sex; what we observe 
are the consequences of such behavior (teen pregnancy, etc.) or the lack 
thereof. If people take adequate precautions, there might be greater 
deviance than expected, but people might still believe that the norm is 
widely practiced in the population.5 Norms regulating private behavior 
may thus present us with cases in which Conditions 2(a) and 2(b) are 
satisfied. However, as I shall make clear in discussing Conditions 2(b) 
and 2(b'), there are many individuals for whom 2(b'), the possibility of 
sanctions, is a necessary condition for compliance. Such individuals will 
believe they are expected to follow the norm but will not expect to be 
sanctioned for transgressing it [Condition 2 (b')], because deviance can 
be concealed. In this case, public endorsement of the norm may coexist 
with considerable private deviance. 
The expectations mentioned in Condition 2(a) could, besides being 
empirical, also be normative, in the sense that people might think that 
5 . 
I would venture the hypothesis that norms regulating private behavior may survive longer 
than other norms precisely because of the lack of direct observation of compliance. On 
the other hand, they may decay very quickly once the magnitude of deviance becomes 
public knowledge, as I discuss in Chapter 5. 
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everyone 'ought to' conform to Rin situations of typeS. The 'ought' imp-
licit in a normative belief does not necessarily state an obligation. Take, 
for instance, a well-known convention such as the rule of driving on the 
right side of the road. We believe that people ought to follow that rule 
simply because, if they do not, they risk killing or being killed. If a person 
does not want to jeopardize her life, nor does she have an interest in 
causing harm to others, then we believe she 'ought to' follow the driving 
rule. The 'ought' in this case expresses prudential reasons and is akin to 
saying that, if you have goal x and the best available means to attain xis 
a course of action y, then you ought to adopt y. Consider, on the other 
\ 
hand, a rule of equal division. In this case, we may believe that others 
ought to 'divide the cake in equal parts' because this is the fair thing 
to do. We think they have an obligation to follow the rule, a duty to be 
fair. I do not ask for the moment what grounds this obligation, though I 
shall come back to this question later. At this point it is only important 
to make a distinction between a prudential 'ought' and the statement of 
an obligation. From now on, when I mention 'normative expectations' 
I will always refer to the latter meaning. 
Normative expectations do not necessarily trump empirical ones, and 
very often they coexist. Many well-entrenched social norms are thought 
to be good or reasonable, and people often refer to these qualities in 
justifying their own compliance, as well as in expecting other people to 
comply. Yet there are also cases in which most people do not think that 
others ought to conform to a norm, even when they observe widespread 
conformity (i.e., the number of those prepared to sanction others is very 
small). This happens with norms that many, maybe most, people dislike 
and yet are followed by everyone. Wearing a veil may be an unpleasant 
requirement for many Muslim women, and they may not believe_ that 
one 'ought to' wear it (apart from prudential reasons). But if each woman 
holds the belief that she is expected to wear a veil, in the sense of believing 
that a sufficiently large number of people think she ought to wear a veil 
and prefer that she wears a veil (because it is her religious duty to do so), 
then she will feel great social pressure in that direction, and the result will 
be overall collective compliance. In this case the norm regulates public, 
observable behavior; hence a transgression is easily detected and likely 
to be punished. If it is not public knowledge that most women dislike 
the veil, a woman may even take widespread adherence to this norm as 
evidence that other women follow this practice out of a deep religious 
conviction, and infer that she is expected by everyon<:! else to fulfill her 
religious duty as well. Everyone may secretly feel she is a deviant, but they 
/ 
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will never openly question the norm. I will discuss in Chapter 5 how such 
'pluralistic ignorance' may be responsible for the survival of norms that 
most people dislike.6 For now it is enough to emphasize that a normative 
interpretation of Condition 2 (a) is not necessary for my argument. 
Conditions 2 (b)_!lnd ~(1;>') tell us that people may have different rea-
sons for conditionally preferring to follow a norm. Condition 2(b), the 
normative expectations condition, says that expectations are believed to be recip-
rocal. That is, not only do I expect others to conform, but I also believe 
they expect me to conform. What sort of belief is this? On the one hand, 
it might just be an empirical belief. Ifl have consistently followed Rin sit-
uations of type Sin the past, people may reasonably infer that, ceteris pari-
bus, I will do the same in the future, and that is what I believe. On the 
other hand, it might be a normative belief: I believe a sufficiently large 
number of people think that I have an obligation to conform to R in the 
appropriate circumstances. For some individuals, the fulfillment of Con-
ditions 2(a) and 2(b) is sufficient to induce a preference for conformity. 
That is, such individuals recognize the legitimacy of others' expectations 
and feel an obligation to fulfill them. For others, the possibility of sanc-
tions is crucial to induce a preference for conformity. Condition 2(b') 
says that I believe that those who expect me to conform also prefer me to 
conform, and might be prepared to sanction my behavior when they can 
observe it. Sanctions may be positive or negative. The possibility of sanc-
tions may motivate some individuals to follow a norm, either out of fear 
of punishment or because of a desire to please and thus be rewarded. For-
others, sanctions are irrelevant, and a normative expectation is all they 
need. Condition 2 (b') does not say that transgressions will be punished 
and compliance rewarded. It only states that a sufficiently large subset 
of P may be capable and willing to sanction others. As we shall see in 
a moment, normative expectations are essential for the enforcement of 
social norms. 
Now suppose Conditions 1, 2(a), and either 2(b) or 2(b') hold. Each 
of them is a necessary condition for conformity to R, but contingency, 
empirical, and normative expectations are not jointly sufficient to produce 
conformity to rule Rin situations of type S. I might expect others to follow 
a rule of equal division, and believe that I am expected to follow that rule 
6 
What social psychologists call pluralistic ignorance is a psychological state characterized by 
the belief that one's private thoughts, attitudes, and feelings are different from those of 
others, when in fact they are not, in a situation where public behavior contradicting these 
private thoughts and attitudes is identical (Allport 1924; Miller and McFarland 1991). 
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too, but when it is my turn to 'cut the cake,' I may be tempted to get a 
larger share, especially if nobody is observing my action. If I do not, · 
must be that I prefer to conform to the rule. However, this is no simple, 
unconditional preference for conformity. Condition 2, the conditional 
preference condition, says this preference is conditional on expecting others 
to conform to Rand either believing that one is expected to conform toR 
or believing that those who expect one to conform also have a preference 
for collective conformity and are prepared to punish or reward. If so, the 
counter factual "If I were to believe that otpers do not follow R or do not 
expect me to follow R, then I would not want to conform to R" must 
be true. vVhat I am saying suggests that following a social norm may 
be contrary to self-interest, especially if we define it in purely material 
terms. Thus it may be the case that, in the presence of monetary or 
otherwise 'material' rewards, I have a tendency to prefer more to less but 
will prefer to 'share' if I believe that I am in a situation in which some 
form of generosity is the norm, if I expect others to be generous, and if 
I believe them to think I 'ought to' be generous in the circumstances. In 
this case, I might prefer to behave generously. Note that the generous 
behavior induced by adherence to a norm should not be confused with 
other motives, such as altruism or benevolence. 
Before we continue our discussion of Condition 2, let us look at an 
example that will hopefully clarity what I mean by saying that the motive 
to follow a norm should be distinguished from other motives. Consider 
playing a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, where C stands for Cooperate and 
D stands for Defect. 
If the payoffs in Figure 1.1 represent sums of money, just by looking 
at them it is not obvious what a player will choose. Suppose Self, the row 
player, only cares about his 'material' self-interest and thus prefers DC 
to CC, CC toDD, and DD to CD. IfB stands for best, S for second best, 
Others 
c D 
c 3,3 0,4 
Self 
D 4, 0 I, I 
FIGURE 1.1. One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma 
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Others 
c D 
c s w 
-·self 
D B T 
1 2 One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma from the perspective of narrowly self-FIGURE · · 
interested Self 
T for third best, and W for worst, the preference ranking of a narrowly 
self-interested Self would look like that shmvn in Figure 1.2. . 
The narrowly self-interested person will always choose D, her dommant 
strategy. Self-interest, however, should not be confused with :he desire.for 
material incentives. A self-interested person is one whose ultimate desires 
are self-regarding, but these desires can involve 'immaterial' goods ~uch 
as power and recognition, or the experience o~ 'benevolent'. emotions. 
A self-interested person may want to 'feel good (or reap. social n:war~s 
like status and love) by reciprocating expected cooperation and m this 
case her preferences would look like those in Figure 1.3. 
7 
Others 
c D 
c B T 
Self 
D w s 
FIGURE 1.3. One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma from the perspective ofbenevolentSelf 
7 I am assuming for simplicity that the benevolent individual is concerne~ with the materi~l 
well-being of another. The same assumption holds for the pure altruist. However, their. 
utility functions look very different. If Xi and xi are the payoffs, respectively, of player x 
and player j, the pure altruist's utility will be U; J(x1), ar:d 8Uiflixi_> 0. The ~enevolent 
player's utility instead will be U; /( x;, Xj), and the first partml denvatJves of U; With respect 
to x;, x1, will be strictly positive. 
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Others 
_c D 
c s B 
Self 
D w T 
FIGURE 1.4. One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma from the perspective of altruistic Self 
Note that a benevolent person would prefer CD to DC; that is, she 
would prefer, ceteris paribus, to be the righteous sucker rather than the 
spiteful cheat. This preference would probably be cost-sensitive, but if 
the costs are not too high, it makes sense to prefer to 'feel good about 
oneself and be the loser rather than penalizing another to get some small 
benefit. 
Benevolent motives are different from those of a pure altruist, whom 
I take to be a person whose ultimate desires are completely other-
regarding. A pure altruist wants, first and foremost, the satisfaction of 
another's desires, at whatever cost to the self.8 If the altruist believes 
his partner to be a narrowly self-interested type, the altruist's preference 
ranking would look like the one in Figure 1.4. 
The person who instead follows a norm of generosity or cooperation 
need not have a desire to 'feel good': If the established norm is a coop-
erative one, provided Conditions 2(a) and either 2(b) or 2(b') are met, 
the preference ranking of the norm follower will look like the one in 
Figure 1.5. 
The norm follower's preferences are similar to those of the self-
interested, benevolent person, with a crucial difference: For the benev-
olent person, it is better to be the 'sucker' than the 'crook' (CD is pre-
ferred to DC); but for the norm follower, the reverse may be true.9 This 
distinction should not be interpreted as denying that individuals can be 
both benevolent and norm followers. Benevolence, however, is usually 
8 The choice to donate part of one's liver to an anonymous recipient is an example of 
altruism, because the risk of complications and even death from the procedure is sizable. 
9 Again, I am assuming for simplicity that the norm follower is not also benevolent. If this 
were the case, Figures 1.3 and 1.5 would coincide, at least in all those situations to which 
benevolence applies. In large, anonymous groups, where the effects of one's actions are 
insignificant, we may expect less cooperation (or not at all) from the benevolent person, 
whereas the norm follower would not be affected. 
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Others 
c D 
c B w 
Self 
D T s 
FIGURE 1.5. One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma from the perspective of norm-following 
Self 
directed to people with whom we habitually interact and know well. As 
social distance increases, benevolence tends to decrease. If most people 
were benevolent toward strangers, we would need no pro-social norms 
of fairness, reciprocity, or cooperation. In particular, we would have no 
need for those norms that 'internalize' externalities created by behavior 
that imposes costs on other people. Thus it is plausible that one is guided 
by benevolence (or even altruism) in interacting with family and friends, 
but when interacting with strangers, be guided by social norms. More-
over, whereas benevolence toward those who are close to us should be a 
relatively stable disposition, generosity or cooperativeness with strangers 
will vary according to our expectations, as defined in Conditions 2(a) 
and 2(b) or 2(b'). 
It may be objected that motivational distinctions are futile, because 
often observation cannot discriminate among them. If in a one-shot social 
dilemma experiment we observe consistent cooperative behavior, what 
can we say about the underlying preferences? If, as economists do, we take 
preferences to describe behavior and not motivation, what we observe is 
a 'revealed preference' for taking into account other people's welfare. 
Why we do that does not matter. Still, I believe motivations carry some 
weight. Up to now, most experiments have been geared to show that 
human behavior consistently deviates from the narrow, self-interested 
paradigm postulated by traditional economic models. Experiments have 
been very successful in this respect, yet they do not tell us why actors 
have other-regarding preferences. Is it altruism, benevolence, or are we 
priming norms of fairness and reciprocity? The answer is clearly impor-
tant, and not just for the policymaker. What we now need is to test more 
sophisticated hypotheses about what goes on in the black box. To do so 
it is important to pay attention to the meanings of the concepts we use 
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(and test). To tell altruism and benevolence apart is not very difficult: If · 
an altruist is informed that the other defected, the altruist should keep 
cooperating. Never mind there are very few such people around: If they . 
exist, that is the way altruists will behave. The benevolent individual and 
the norm follower are more difficult to set apart. For one, a norm follower 
may also be motivated by benevolence. If, however, some norm follow-
ers are not benevolent, the distinction would be most clear in all those 
situations in which people are forced to choose between CD and DC. 
Suppose we identify a subset of people who 'conditionally cooperate' in 
one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas. That is, controlling for their expectations, 
they cooperate whenever they expect others to cooperate, too. It should 
be possible to perform another experiment on the same individuals in 
which the only choice is one between being the sucker or the crook: The 
subject might be told that the other player will choose next, and will have 
to choose the opposite of what she does. Provided the personal cost is 
not too high, the benevolent person should prefer being the sucker. A 
person who instead followed a cooperative norm for reasons other than 
benevolence would see no reason to be the sucker (possibly provided the 
cost to the other person is not too great). 
Condition 2 (the conditional preference condition) marks an important 
distinction between social and personal norms, whether they are habits 
or have moral force. Take the habit of brushing my teeth every morning. 
I find it sanitary, and I like the taste of mint toothpaste. Even ifl came to 
realize that most people stopped brushing their teeth, I would continue to 
do so, because I have independent reasons for doing it. It is likewise with 
moral norms: I have good, independent reasons to avoid killing people I 
deeply dislike. Even iflwere to find myself in a Hobbesian state of nature, 
without rules or rights, I would still feel repugnance and anguish at the 
idea of taking a life. With this I do not mean to suggest that moral norms 
are a world apart from other rules. Instead, by their very nature, moral 
norms demand (at least in principle) an unconditional commitment.10 
10 It might be argued that even what we usually underst~nd as moral norms are conditional. 
One may be thoroughly committed to respect the sanctity of human life, but there are 
circumstances in which one's commitment would waver. Imagine finding oneself in a 
community where violence and murder are daily occurrences, expected and condoned 
by most. One would probably at first resist violence, then react to it, and finally act it 
out oneself. Guilt and remorse would in time be replaced by complacency, as one might 
come to feel the act of murder to be entirely necessary and justified. The testimonies of 
survivors of concentration camps, as well a.S the personal recollections of SS officers, are 
frightening examples of how fragile our most valued principles can be. 
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Commitments of course may falter, and we may run afoul of even the 
most cherished obligations. The point is that, under normal conditions, 
expectations of other people's conformity to a moral rule are not a good 
reason to obey it. Nor is it a good reason that others expect me to follow 
a moral rule. If Lfind their expectation reasonable, it is because I find 
the moral norm reasonable; so the reason to obey it must reside in the 
norm itself. What I am saying goes against the well-known Humean inter-
pretation of our moral obligation to follow the requirements of justice 
(Hume 1751). This moral obligation is, according to Hume, conditional 
on the expectation that others are following the norms of justice too. · 
In my interpretation, Hume's requirements ofjustice are social norms, 
because they fulfill my conditions for a social norm to exist. What dis-
tinguishes norms of justice from other social norms is that 'i:nany of us 
would have a conditional preference for abiding by such norms because 
we acknowledge that the normative expectations expressed by Condition 
2(b) are legitimate and should therefore be satisfied. Their legitimacy may 
stem from recognizing how important it is for the good functioning of our 
society to have such norms, but of course their ongoing value depends on 
widespread conformity. There is nothing inherently good in our fairness 
norms, above and beyond their role in regulating our ways of allocating 
and distributing goods and privileges according to the basic structure of 
our society.U However, many of us would feel there is something inher- . 
ently bad in taking a life, especially when the victim is a close kin. All 
known societies have developed similar rules against killing one's kin 
or mating with one's parents. The unconditional preference most of us 
have for not committing such acts may have an evolutionary origin, and 
typically contemplating killing or incest elicits a strong, negative emo-
tional response of repugnance. What needs to be stressed here is that 
what makes something a social or a moral norm is our attitude toward 
it.12 How we justifY our conditional or unconditional allegiance has no 
bearing on the reality ofthe distinction, and the latter is all that matters 
to my definition of social norms. 
Condition 2 also helps in distinguishing a social norm from a collective 
habit. People in Pittsburgh wear coats in winter. I expect them to keep 
11 
The fact that 'fair' allocations reflect the structure of society is well known to anthro-
pologists. In traditional, authoritarian societies, for example, the allocation of goods is 
based on rank. Such allocations are accepted by all the involved parties as just (Fiske 
1992). 
12 
Our attitudes are also shaped in part by the norms that we internalize, which results in 
a positive feedback loop between attitudes and adherence to norms. 
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wearing coats in winter and, were anypne interested in my attire, I would 
say they expect me to wear a coat in winter. But these expectations have no 
bearing on my decision to wear a coat. There is no connection between 
my preference for wearing a coat and my expectations about the rest 
of the population. My not wearing a coat in winter may violate their 
expectations, and it may cause surprise and puzzlement, but does it matter 
to my choice? It does not, because I have independent reasons to wear a 
coat in winter. Condition 2 instead tells that my preference for conformity 
depends on the expectation that others conform, and either the belief that 
they expect me to conform or the belief that they also prefer me to 
conform (and may sanction my behavior). Using the language-of game 
theory, we may say that compliance with R is not a strictly dominant 
strategy.13 If it were, one would want to follow R irrespective of one's 
expectation about others' behavior. 
Taken together, the conditions I have stated tell us that social norms 
motivate action, but they do so only indirectly. The direct, underlying 
motives are the beliefs and desires that support the norm. Thus the pres-
ence of a norm of reciprocity, and its salience in a particular situation, 
motivate me to act in a congruent manner, but my behavior is ultim'!tely 
explainable only by reference to my preferences and expectations. This 
statement should not be surprising to those who adopt a methodological 
individualist perspective. In this perspective, a norm is a social construct 
reducible to the beliefs and desires of those involved in its practice; if 
individuals for some reason stopped having those beliefs and desires, the 
norm would cease to exist. 
The conditions for a norm to exist entail, when they are fulfilled, that 
a social norm is an equilibrium. First, let me briefly define the notion of 
equilibrium as it is widely used in the social sciences. An equilibrium is a 
situation that involves several individuals or groups, in which each one's 
action is a best reply to everyone else's action. It is a situation of stable 
mutual adjustment: Everyone anticipates everyone else's behavior, and all 
these anticipations turn out to be correct. In other words, an equilibrium 
is a set of self-fulfilling prophecies that individuals formulate about each 
other's actions. Social norms, as I stated before, have no reality other 
than our beliefs that others behave according to them and e~pect us to 
13 A (strictly) dominant strategy is a strategy that gives the individual who chooses it a 
better payoff (usually expressed in utility) than any other available strategy. In a game-
theoretic context, a (strictly) dominant strategy gives a better payoff than any otl1er 
available strategy independently of what the other players do. 
Social Norms 23 
behave according to them. In equilibrium, such beliefs are confirmed 
by experience and thus they become more and more ingrained as time 
goes on. A norm of reciprocity is supported by our beliefs that people will 
comply with it, and that they expect us to comply with it too. Each time 
we reCiprocate we.strengt!J.en the norm and confirm those expectations. 
In equilibrium everyone reciprocates and is right to do so. But there 
could also be another equilibrium in which nobody reciprocates. If peo-
ple expected no reciprocity, there would be no trust in the first place, and 
again expectations would be self-fulfilling: Everyone would distrust and 
would be right to do so, because nobody would reciprocate. A situation 
in which some reciprocate and some do not would not be stable, for the 
second group might learn that they would do better by reciprocating, and 
thus switch their strategy (or the first group might learn not to recipro-
cate, and change their strategy). In some recent work on norm emergence 
(Bicchieri et al. 2004), I looked at how a norm of trust/reciprocity can 
emerge in a situation in which different groups display different behav-
iors, and how they may solidify into an equilibrium. For now, let us agree 
that social norms, those bundles of self-fulfilling expectations we live by, 
are equilibria. 
If a social norm is followed, then by definition individuals' expecta-
tions are self-fulfilling, in the sense that the combination of empirical 
and normative expectations [Conditions 2(a) and 2(b) or 2(b')] give 
one a reason to obey the norm. What sort of reason is this? As I already 
mentioned, I believe different people may have different reasons for com-
pliance that extend beyond the standard reasons given by many social 
scientists, namely, that we fear punishment when we disobey a norm. It is 
certainly possible that some may fear the consequences of violating oth-
ers' normative expectations, because violation may trigger resentment 
and unpleasant consequences for the transgressor.14 Such individuals 
would be motivated to follow a norm to avoid negative sanctions. Yet 
I would argue that another reason for compliance is the desire to please 
others by doing something others expect and prefer one to do. In this 
case, the expectation of a positive sanction would be a reason for com-
pliance. A third reason for compliance with a norm is that one accepts 
others' normative expectations as well founded. In this case, sanctions 
14 
This is often tile case when members of group A impose certain norms on members of 
group B (the target group). In tl1is case most members ofB would conform out offear 
of punishment or because of tile desire to be rewarded for good behavior. Conditions 
2(a) and 2(b') would in this case refer to expectations about the targeted members of P 
only. 
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have no weight. If I recognize your expectations as reasonable, I have a 
reason to fulfill them. I may still be tempted to do something else con-
trary to your expectations, but then I would have to justifY (if only to 
myself) my choice by offering alternative good reasons and show how 
they trump your reasons. This need to offer a justification (to myself as 
well as others) signals that I recognize others' expectations as cogent. The 
acceptance of others' expectations as legitimate is usually accompanied 
by the recognition that negative sanctions against transgressors are also 
legitimate. If your expectation is reasonable, I must also acknowledge 
that it is reasonable for you to punish my transgression, even if the repri-
mand is nothing more than an expression of disapproval of my behavior. 
The common observation that norm transgression is often accompanied 
by punishment (or the expectation of punishment) does not entail that 
norms are only supported by sanctions, in the sense that if sanctions were 
not there, conformity would be entirely absent. Recognizing punishment 
as legitimate is different from acknowledging that, de facto, violations are 
punished. The latter does not involve understanding conformity expecta-
tions as valid, whereas the former presupposes the acceptance of a norm. 
It is important to acknowledge that different individuals may need differ-
ent normative expectations in order to be prepared to obey a norm, and 
that an individual may follow some norms, but not others, in the·absence 
of any expected sanction.15 
Fear and the desire to please are powerful motives, but they imply that 
a norm would only be followed in circumstances in which either there is 
monitoring of one's actions and sanctioning is possible (as in repeated 
interaction) or there is some way to ensure that one's action is acknowl-
edged by the people one wants to please or else has a noticeable effect on 
theirwell-being.16 Under anonymity conditions, and when one's action 
effects are insignificant (as when contributing to some public goods), 
the motivation to obey a norm would falter. A possible objection to this 
conclusion is that we may feel guilt at violating a norm, and the emotion 
of guilt supports conformity even in the absence of external monitoring 
and sanctioning (Elster 1989). According to this view, emotions directly 
cause conformity. But why and when do we feel guilt? Imagine a situa-
tion in which someone does not expect others to conform to a practice 
of truth-telling. He has observed people openly lying and has been lied 
15 In Chapter 3, I discuss the differences we observe in the behavior of Proposers in Ulti-
matum versus Dictator games. 
16 Individuals differ as to the scope of people they want to plea.se. Most of us stop at family 
and friends, but some may include acquaintances and even strangers. 
j 
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often enough to expect further dishonesty. Yet he is made to believe 
:at he is expected to conform to a norm of truth-telling. It is likely that 
this individual would consider the expectation illegitimate, and he would 
feel no guilt at violating it. Guilt, as well as resentment, presuppose the 
violation of expectations-we consider legitimate. It is irrational to resent a 
alfunctioning computer, but it is reasonable to resent the seller if we 
~ink he should have known (and told us) the computer was defective. 
We trusted him, and he flouted our legitimate expectations of honesty 
and good faith. Guilt and resentment signal that a social norm is in place 
and that mutual conformity expectations are legitimate. It is reasonable 
to feel guilt or resentment precisely because there is a norm, a set of 
mutual expectations that we recognize should be met. The existence of 
an accepted norm that one contemplates violating is the source of guilt, 
but it is the recognized legitimacy of mutual normative expectations, not 
the emotion of guilt, that motivates conformity. 
Notice that I am not postulating a generic desire to meet, whenever 
. possible, other people's expectations. In his analysis of conventions, Sug-
den (2000) assumed we possess a 'natural aversion' toward acting con-
trary to the preferences (and expectations) of others. This propensity 
may be true for the preferences and expectations of fumily and friends, 
but it is hardly at work with strangers. As social distance increases, we tend 
to care less and less for others' preferences and expectations, especially 
when these preferences and expectations run counter to other interests 
we have. Sugden's assumption would restrict norm-abiding behavior to 
a circle of fumily and friends, but these are precisely the circumstances 
where norms are not needed. In large, anonymous groups, if we do not 
want to act contrary to others' normative expectations, it must be because 
we find such expectations reasonable. The acceptance of others' norma-
tive expectations as reasonable is the third kind of motive to conform to a 
social norm I mentioned before. This need not be a motive for everyone, 
but in all cases in which anonymity and the absence of sanctions tempt us 
to defect, for a norm to survive there must be a critical number of people 
for which such r~asons have power. 
Since social norms often go against our self-interest, especially if we nar-
rowly interpret it as a desire for material possessions, a social norm need 
not be an equilibrium of an ordinary game in which payoffs represent 
self-interested preferences. Thus, for example, a cooperative norm can-
not be a Nash equilibrium of the PD game represented in Figure LIP If 
17 
A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that each 
player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies played by the other players. 
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FIGURE 1.6. Norms transform games 
such a norm exists and is followed, however, the original PD game would 
be transformed (at least for the norm followers) into the subsequent, 
very different game shown in Figure 1.6. 
In the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma game, each player's preference 
ranking is DC> CC > DD >CD. As before, B stands for 'best,' S for 'second 
best,' and so on. In the symmetric game of Figure 1.6 instead, each norm 
follower's preference ranking is CC > DD >DC > CD. That is, the players 
who follow a cooperative norm will do it because their empirical and 
normative expectations have been met and hence they prefer to obey the 
norm. The new game in Figure 1.6 is a coordination game with two strict 
Nash equilibria, one of which is Pareto superior to the other.l8•19 When 
a norm of cooperation is obeyed, a game like the PD of Figure 1.1 is 
transformed into a coordination game: Players' payoffs in the new game will 
differ from the payoffs of the original game, because their preferences · 
and beliefs will be as in Conditions 2, 2(a), and 2(b) or 2(b') previously· 
outlined. Indeed, if a player knows that a cooperative norm exists and 
expects a sizeable part of the population to follow it, then, provided she 
also believes she is expected (and maybe also preferred) to follow such 
norm, she will have a preference to conform to the norm in~ situation in 
which she has the choice to cooperate or to defect. Note tliat what I am 
saying implies that a social norm, unlike a convention, is never a solution 
18 In a strict Nash equilibrium each player's strategy is a unique best reply to the other 
players' strategies. This means that a strict Nash equilibrium cannot include weakly 
dominated strategies. 
19 A coordination game is a game in which there are at least two Nash equilibria in pure 
strategies, and players have a mutual interest in reaching one of these equilibria (CC or 
DD in Figure 1.6), even if different players may prefer different equilibria (which is not 
the case in Figure 1.6). 
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Nature 
T-p 
c D c D 
c s,s W,B c B,B W,T 
D B,W T,T D T,W s,s 
PDGame Coordination Game 
FIGURE 1.7. A Bayesian game 
of an original coordination game, though it is an equilibrium of the new, 
transformed game it creates. . 
It is important to recall that my definition of social norm does not entail 
that everybody conforms. In fact, the definition says that a social norm may 
exist and not be followed. For some, the PD game of Figure 1.1 is never 
transformed into any other game. And even a person who starts playing 
a coordination game like the one in Figure 1.6 may revert to playing the 
regular PD game if she realizes that Condition 2 (a) (empirical expectations) 
is violated. Let me clarifY this point with a simple example. Suppose an 
actor is faced with a finitely repeated PD, and suppose the situation is 
such that a 'cooperative' norm is primed. 20 The player knows there exists 
a cooperative norm that applies to this kind of situation. The player also 
knows that there are several types of players, some of which would not see 
the game as he does. To make matters easy, suppose there are two types 
of players, those who simply see the game as a PD and those who follow 
a cooperative norm.21 In this case we may model the choice situation as 
a Bayesian game (Figure 1.7) in which Nature picks a player type with a 
given probability, so that with prior probability p the opponent one faces 
20 
In Chapter 4 I discuss in detail how such 'cooperative' norms might be primed. 
21 
In a finitely repeated game, even a 'selfish' player may want to cooperate for a while, if 
it is not common knowledge that all players are rational and selfish (Krep~ eta!. 19~2). 
This consideration, however, has no, bearing on my argument because, until a defection 
is observed, a player cannot distinguish between a forward-thinking selfish type and a 
true cooperator. 
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is playing a coordination game, and with probability (1 - p) he is playing 
a PD game.22 If a norm-follower assesses a sufficiently high probability to 
being matched with a similar type, he will cooperate.23 
When faced with a defection, however, the player will reassess his prob-
abilities and possibly revert to playing the equilibrium strategy (defect) 
for the traditional PD game. One might thus say that the existence of a norm 
always presents a conditional follower with a Bayesian game: If the nor-
mative and empirical expectations conditions are fulfilled, she will assess 
a higher probability to being matched with a similar player type (a norm 
follower) and act accordingly. But she must also be prepared to revise 
her probabilistic assessment in case experience contravenes her previous 
expectations. 24 Note that the existence of a social norm facilitates equilib-
rium selection in the Bayesian game fuced by the conditional norm follow-
ers. If the probability of being matched with a similar type is high enough, 
C,C is the selected equilibrium; otherwise D,D will be selected. (Appendix 
1 presents a formal treatment of a norm-based utility function and 
the conditions under which a PD game becomes a coordination game.) 
This simple and elegant game-theoretic model offers a language, built 
on the notions of belief and preference, in which to cast what we com-
monly observe: In an experimental setting in which repetitions of a PD-
like game are allowed, we witness high initial levels of cooperatio~. Yet 
cooperation precipitously declines as soon as some players defect (Fehr 
and Gachter 2000a). Whether a game-theoretic model provides an accept-
able explanation for what we observe depends in part on our willingness 
to take 'as if models seriously, which in turn relates to the possibility of 
drawing interesting predictions from them. In the case at hand, people 
may not be aware of their preferences and never have made a proba-
bilistic assessment of the situation; yet, if we take their behavior to reveal 
certain dispositions, we may predict that, ceteris paribus, factors that we 
expect will change their expectations will have a measurable effect on 
future choices. 
22 When players are uncertain as to the type of player they are facing, they will assess some 
probability that the other player is of a certain type. Typically the list of all possible 
types and their prior probability of occurring in the population are taken to be common 
knowledge among the players (Harsanyi 1967, 1968). 
23 If players use an availability heuristic to come to this probability assessment, the proba-
bility of playing a coordination game might initially be much higher. That is, if a player 
is the type who follows a cooperative norm, he tends to believe there is a high probability 
that others are like him. 
24 This revision is governed by a "learning rule." I discuss one such rule in Chapter 6. 
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Descriptive Norms 
Let us now look at how the definition of social norms given above dif-
ferentiates several types of social constructs and behaviors that are often 
lumped together. Sometime~ 'norm' means what people commonly do in 
certain situations, what constitutes 'normal' or 'regular' behavior. This 
notion of regular behavior differs in important respects both from a 
shared habit and from what people believe ought to be done, what is 
socially approved or disapproved. The regular behaviors I am referring 
to, and their influence on people's choices, have been extensively studied 
by social psychologists, most notably Cialdini et al. (1990), who dubbed 
them descriptive norms. Examples of descriptive norms are all sorts of 
fashions and fuds, in addition to the many collective behaviors that peo-
ple (rightly or wrongly) deem to convey important information about 
the surrounding world. Conventions, as we shall see, are a kind of descrip-
tive norm, but not all descriptive norms become stable conventions. Note 
that there is no intrinsic property of a behavioral pattern that makes it 
a descriptive norm: What is a descriptive norm for one group may be 
an entrenched social norm for another. Dress codes are a case in point. 
For the office workers at a particular firm, a 'dress-down Friday' informal 
rule is nothing more than a fashion code that, though widely adopted, 
remains entirely discretionary. For teenage members of a Los Angeles 
gang, on the contrary, a dress code may signal group loyalty, so much so 
that every member is expected to rigidly adhere to the code and trans-
gressions are punished. What makes a collective behavior a descriptive or 
a social norm are the expectations and motives of the people involved. 
This point is worth emphasizing: It is the way we relate to behavioral rules 
by way of preferences and expectations that gives them their identity as 
habits, norms, or mere conventions. 
We conform to social norms because we have reasons to fulfill oth-
ers' normative expectations. These reasons often conflict with our self-
interest, at least narrowly defined. Conformity to descriptive norms is, on 
the contrary, always dictated by self-interest: We conform because such 
norms make life easier for us, because we want to 'fit in' or do the right 
thing- as when we adopt a new fashion- or simply because they provide 
evidence of what is likely to be effective, adaptive behavior, as when we 
bought Internet stocks because many people we know were buying them 
and were doing well. Often there are good prudential or informational 
reasons to "do as the Romans do." Conformity to a descriptive norm 
may be motivated by a desire to imitate others' behavior in uncertain or 
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ambiguous situations. In such circumstances, others' behavior provides us 
with information about the appropriate course of action, as when a young 
employee imitates older, more experienced colleagues' way of,handling 
complaints. Imitation may be a reasonable, cost-effective choice, provided 
we believe that the majority's behavior or opinion conveys the informa-
tion we lack. There are many occasions in which we have to make a quick 
decision without much information about the environment: Gathering 
information may be unfeasible or have too high an opportunity cost in 
terms of resources (such as time and money) that one would more effec-
tively employ elsewhere. Or we may be in a condition in which the wrong 
decision could have serious consequences, and we lack the expertise 
to properly evaluate the situation. Conversely, there are circumstances 
in which the consequences of a decision are not too important, and 
here again gathering information seems a waste of resources. In all these 
cases, we look at the choices other people make as a guide to our own 
choices. ·while this may seem like a good deal for the actors at the time, 
it can ultimately mean all actors depend on the choices of one (or a few) 
first mover(s), and those choices may or may not be good ones. This 
type of 'informational cascade' (Banerjee 1992) may be the reason why 
some inefficient descriptive norms emerge and persist, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 5. 
For now let me stress that conformity to a descriptive norm need not 
involve an obligation or normative expectations: We do not feel any group 
pressure to conform, nor do we believe that others expect us to comply 
with what appears to be a collective behavior. Deviation from the 'norm' 
is not punished, nor is compliance overtly approved. For example, if 
I decide - alone among my friends and co-workers - not to invest my 
retirement money in stocks, I do not expect to be blamed or ostracized. 
At worst, they will think I am overly cautious. A crucial feature of descrip-
tive norms is thus that they entail unilateral expectations. Though we may 
have come to expect others to follow a regular behavioral pattern, we 
do not feel any social pressure to conform. That is, Conditiop.s 1, 2, and 
2(a) apply but Conditions 2(b) and 2(b') do not. In most cases of descrip-
tive norms, there simply are no reciprocal expectations: We do not believe 
others care about our choices or expect us to follow any particular behav-
ior. When I choose to adopt a new fashion, I usually do not think I am 
"""' expected to follow it. But even in those cases in which we are aware that we 
might be expected to follow the majority's decision or opinion, we do not 
count on being blamed if we follow a different path. Others may think it 
would be prudent or reasonable for us to behave as they do (for example, 
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ick a certain stock portfolio), but the 'ought' involved in stating pru-
toP · · f · h I · h dential reasons IS very different rom a normative oug t. mig t recog-
. the reasonableness of others' expectations, but not their legitimacy. 
nize . . th' . c: I' Fulfilling others' expectations m IS case IS not a reason .tOr comp I-
e ~hereas expecting a-majority of people to behave in a given way anc, 
is a necessary reason to adopt that behavior. It is only a necessary reason, 
however, because one must also have a conditional preference for conform-
ing. Expectations alone cannot motivate a choice: My choice to conform 
depends on expecting a majority of people to conform, but it must be 
that I prefer to follow such 'normal' behavior on condition that it is 
the majority's behavior. This latter condition differentiates a descriptive 
norm from a collective habit: In the example of wearing a coat in the 
Pittsburgh winter, I have an independent reason (and thus a preference) 
to wear a coat, irrespective of what other people do. But in the case of 
a new fashion, following it depends on one's perception of what other 
people do. Mter Mary Quant introduced the miniskirt in the 1960s, it 
probably took a small number of trendsetters to reach a critical mass 
and start what became a major change in women's fashion. That critical 
mass of women, however, was crucial in determining the success of the 
new attire: Most women would not have started wearing a miniskirt if not 
for the sense that it was now 'in' and many celebrities were wearing it. It 
should be noted that often it is the perception of a critical mass, rather than 
a real critical mass, that tips the balance in favor of the new behavior. A 
small but vocal minority, or an endorsement by some celebrity, may thus 
be enough to induce a change in mass behavior. 
The conditional preference for conformity may be dictated, among 
other things, by a desire to 'fit in' or be fashionable, or just by prudential 
reasons; it does not, however, spring from a desire to fulfill other people's 
expectations or from fear of being punished if one does not meet them. 
For a descriptive norm to exist, the following conditions must be met. 
Conditions far a Descriptive Norm to Exist 
Let Rbe a behavioral rule for situations of typeS, where Sis a coordination 
game. We say that Ris a descriptive norm in a population Pifthere exists 
a sufficiently large subset Per ~ P such that, for each individual i E P cf, 
l. Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of 
typeS; 
2. Conditional preference: iprefers to conform to Rin situations of typeS 
on the condition that: 
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(a) Empirical expectations: ibelieves that a sufficiently large subset of 
P conforms to R in situations of type S. 
A descriptive norm is followed by population Pif there exists a suffi-
ciently large subset Pc ~Pee such that, for all i E Pr, Condition 2(a) is met 
for i and as a result i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S. 
A descriptive norm thus tells what a person would do if he had certain 
expectations. For instance, "walk on the left side of the sidewalk" and 
"walk on the right side of the sidewalk" are both descriptive norms. Some 
people may follow the first rule (because they expect others to do the 
same), some people may follow the second rule (again, because they 
expect others to do the same), and some people may follow neither rule 
(because they do not expect a sufficient number of other people to walk 
on a specific side of the sidewalk). Even in a society where one of the 
rules has been conventionalized, it is clear that the other rule still exists 
as a possibility: I drive on the right side of the road, but if I observed 
large numbers of people driving on the left side of a particular road, my 
expectations would change and I would con,sider driving on the left side 
of that road. 
As in the case of social norms, the preference for conformity is qmdi-
tional, but this time it is only conditional on expecting others to follow 
the behavioral rule in a given class of situations. Note that a descriptive 
norm that is followed is an equilibrium, in the sense that followers' beliefs 
will be self-fulfilling: If one believes R to be widely followed, then it is in 
one's interest to follow R, too. Thus, if enough people come to believeR 
is the 'norm,' they will behave in ways that further validate those beliefs. 
The conditional preference for conformity may be driven by the desire 
to imitate those we believe are more informed or by the hope of 'fitting 
in' a group we value. Or it may simply be the wish of doing what we think 
most people do. Be it as it may, a preference for conformity depends on 
expecting others to conform to R. 
If a descriptive norm is an equilibrium, what sort of game is it an ~qui­
librium of? Consider again the miniskirt fashion: In this case, a woman 
has several choices of attire, of which the miniskirt is one. Assume for 
simplicity that there are only three possible types of clothes women can 
choose from: M (miniskirt), L (long skirt), and P (pants). Assume also 
that a woman already has L and P in her wardrobe, and has to decicJ.e 
whether to buy and wear M. The choice of M is thus more costly than L 
or P, but she prefers above all to be fashionable. Her choice matrix would 
look like the one in Figure 1.8. 
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Others 
M L p 
M 1, 2 0, 1 0, 1 ·---. -· 
Self L 0,2 2, 1 0, 1 
p 0,2 0, 1 2, 1 
FIGURE 1.8. An Imitation game 
Notice that the payoffs of 'Others' need not be the same as the payoffs 
of 'Self.' Indeed, suppose 'Others' are the trendsetters that start a new 
fushion. I assume the trendsetters will not care whether 'Self' follows 
the new fashion; what the trendsetters care about is self-expression, and 
starting a new fashion is not their goal [M may have a higher payoff 
(2) for trendsetters because they always prefer to do the 'new' thing]. 
'Self' instead wants to imitate the trendsetters; hence she cares about 
whether she coordinates with 'Others.' Because 'Others' may not care at 
all about being imitated, the three Nash equilibria of the game are not 
strict. Imitation is a one-sided coordination game.25 Even if the choice 
of M is more costly than P or L for 'Self' (it has a lower payoff), if it 
is believed that now "it is in wearing miniskirts," the imitators' choices 
will converge to M. The example shows that a descriptive norm may be a 
suboptimal equilibrium and still be the one chosen by the players. It also 
shows that the class of games of which descriptive norms are equilibria is 
much larger than the class of coordination games of which conventions 
are equilibria. As I shall discuss shortly, the latter are always coordination 
games without nonstrict Nash equilibria and for that reason, in such 
games, all players prefer that everybody conforms. Such preferences are 
-absent in a descriptive norm. 
Earlier I represented social norms as coordination games, too. There 
is a crucial difference, though. The existence of a social norm transforms a 
game like the Prisoner's Dilemma (oranyothermixed-motive game) into 
25 
Note that 'most other women' need not refer to an entire population or even a large 
group. Some descriptive norms are exclusive, in that they signal belonging to a special, 
selected group. Fashion may play that role on occasion. 
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a coordination game (or a Bayesian game, in which we may be playing a 
coordination game with a given probability), by providing actors with an 
alternative set of expectations and preferences. But the problem that a 
social norm is solving in the first place is never a coordination problem. If 
I expect everybody to cooperate, to be fair, or to reciprocate favors, I may 
be tempted not to, and only a desire to fulfill others' expectations may 
induce me not to stray. This desire may spring from fear, benevolence, 
or the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of others' reasons and expec-
tations. Social norms by and large apply to situations in which there is a 
conflict between selfish and pro-social incentives. In contrast, descriptive 
norms solve a preexisting coordination problem (even if it is a unilateral 
one, as in imitation). If so, following a descriptive norm is not in oppo-
sition to self-interest. Indeed, it is usually in one's self-interest (however 
narrowly defined) to follow a descriptive norm. In sum, we may say that 
a descriptive norm is always an equilibrium strategy of an original coor-
dination game. In a given situation S, a descriptive norm is followed if 
and only if the players of the coordination game expect (with sufficiently 
high probability) a particular equilibrium strategy to be played, and thus 
they play that strategy as well. 26 
Note that the game-theoretic representation is silent about the dynam-
ics leading to one particular equilibrium. We still need a plausible story 
about the dynamics that led women to adopt en masse the miniskirt. For 
the moment, however, this should not be a matter of concern; for now all 
we want to answer are questions about conformity and norm elicitation. 
Conventions 
Descriptive norms, such as fashions and fads, can wane rather quickly, 
but some of them may crystallize into stable conventions, such as signaling 
systems or dressing codes. Such conventions are useful b~cause they coor-
dinate our expectations and often act as signals that facilitate interaction 
and communication. Usually no intrinsic value is attributed to a conven-
tion, although violating it can be costly, as the cost is directly related to 
the consequences of breaching a coordination mechanism. For exam-
ple, the trader on the stock exchange floor signals with her fing~rs how 
many shares she wants to buy or sell. The failure to do so is not socially 
26 A definition of descriptive norms that requires them to be followed would limit descriptive 
norms to a time-varying and imprecisely defined subset of the equilibria and would also 
make it hard to talk about equilibrium strategies that are not currently being played. 
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condemned, sanctioned, or accompanied by guilt. Not following the con-
vention simply means the trader will not be able to communicate what 
she wants and lose an opportunity to gain. When a convention is in place, 
expe<.:tations of compliance are mutuaL An actor expects others to follow 
the convention, ami she also believes she is expected to follow it by the 
other participants in the conventional practice. The traders expect each 
otherto follow the signaling convention, as much as we normally expect a 
competent speaker to stick to the rules of English usage. Yet such mutual 
expectations are never a sufficient reason to adhere to a convention. It 
must be that one has a conditional preference for coordinating and com-
municating with others, as failure to coordinate and communicate comes 
with a personal cost. 
David Lewis first defined conventions as equilibria of coordination 
games (Lewis 1969). According to Lewis, a convention is a regular pattern 
of behavior that is a strict Nash equilibrium in a coordination game with 
n::: 2 strict Nash equilibria.27 ThiS requirement is meant to capture the 
arbitrariness of conventions, in particular the awareness on the part of 
those participating in a convention that there are possible alternative 
arrangements. In a coordination game, the interests of the participants 
may or may not perfectly coincide. In the miniskirt example, all the follow-
ers had the same (ordinal) preferences. In the game in Figure 1. 9, instead, 
the players' interests do not exactly coincide. What matters though is that 
everyone does better by coordinating with the choices of other players 
than by 'going sofo.' 
The game in Figure 1.9 can be interpreted as a situation in which 
two people want to coordinate or 'be together,' but one would prefer to 
go to the Opera whereas the other prefers playing Golf. The game has 
two strict Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (Golf, Golf) and (Opera, 
Opera), and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which 'Other' chooses Golf 
with probability 1/3 and Opera with probability 2/3, and 'Self' chooses 
27 
Lewis's account of convention is quite different from mine, and it runs as follows (p. 78): 
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in 
a recurrent situation Sis a canvention if .and only if it is true that, and it is common 
knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among members of P, (1) almost 
everyone conforms to R; (2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform 
toR; (3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions; ( 4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, 
on condition that almost everyone conforms toR; (5) almost everyone would prefer that 
~ny one more conform toR 1, on condition that almost everyone conform to R 1, where R1 
:s some possible regularity in the behavior of members of PinS, such that almost no one 
ln almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R. 
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Other 
Golf Opera 
Golf 1, 2 0,0 
Self 
Opera 0,0 2, 1 
FIGURE 1.9. A Coordination game 
Golf with probability 2/3 and Opera with probability 1/3. Clearly the 
preferences of the players are not identical. They do, however, prefer to 
be together rather than be separate. The players may settle on one of 
the equilibria for whatever reason, but once they are in equilibrium, they 
have no incentive to deviate from it.28 When I say that a convention is 'self-
sustaining,' I just mean that each actor has a self-interested motivation to 
conform to the convention. 
The matrix in Figure 1.9 does not tell us which equilibrium is played, 
because it all depends on the expectations players bring to the game. 
Thus 'Self may have to settle for Golf, if he expects 'Other' to make 
that choice, and vice versa. But how are these expectations justified? This 
is a well-known problem in game theory: Even if players have common 
knowledge of the structure of the game and of their mutual rationality,. 
usually this information is not sufficient to select a particular equilibrium 
strategy (Bicchieri 1993). In this case, we must introduce some salience 
criterion of choice, and common knowledge thereof, to solve the equi-
librium selection problem. Salience may be provided by precedent or by 
an explicit agreement. Lewis (1969) unambiguously referred to prece-
dent as a mechanism by which players succeed in coordinating on one-
particular equilibrium. Schelling (1960), on the other hand, referred 
to focal points. However, salience and focal points are not satisf~ctory 
solutions, because for them to do their coordination job it must be com-
mon knowledge among the players that they describe the game in the 
same way; but unless it is explicitly assumed, there is no reason to believe 
that common knowledge exists. This interpretation of the coordination 
28 An ~ccou?t_o~ how a convention emerges would look at repetitions of the stage game 
depiCted m Figure 1.9. The convention in this case might be that people alternate 
between Golf and Opera, or that they do one or the other with fixed probabilities. 
Conventions 37 
arne in Figure 1.9 is a static, stylized description of the conditions under 
!hich a convention is likely to emerge, not an analysis of how players attain 
common knowledge of the shared criteria that will help them solve their 
coordination problem. 
Another possible-interpretation of the game in Figure 1.9 is that one 
of the two equilibria has already been selected and consequently a con-
vention is in place. 'Self will know, for example, that in situations of 
type S almost everyone chooses to play golf. She thus has an empirical 
expectation about what 'Other' will do and a conditional preference for 
conformity given her expectation. In this case 'Self will conform and, if 
'Other' has a similar expectation and preference, he will follow the estab-
lished convention, too. In this case no common knowledge is necessary 
for players to play the 'play golf' equilibrium: First-order expectations are 
all that is needed. This interpretation of the game refers to the survival of 
a convention: A convention persists if agents have the right kind of empir-
ical expectations. The question now becomes how agents come to form 
such expectations, or reason inductively from past cases. For example, 
when 'Self is faced with situation s, she will look for analogies with past 
situations she has experienced and eventually decide there are enough 
relevant similarities to categorizes as a member of S, the class of situations 
to which a given behavioral regularity applies. The next step for 'Self' is to 
decide that that particular behavioral regularity can be projected as a gen-
uine regularity; otherwise she would have no reason to expect it to persist. 
Sugden and Cubitt (2003) point out how Lewis explicitly recognized that 
inductive inferences are crucial in maintaining a convention and offer a 
formal model of Lewis's informal description of how common knowledge 
that a behavioral regularity will persist is attained. Without entering into 
the details of Sugden and Cubitt's formal reconstruction of Lewis's argu-
ment, let me point out that Lewis's argument is crucially dependent on 
'!-Ssuming shared inductive standards, and one of these standards is the 
:ommon recognition that only certain behavioral patterns can be pro-
Jected. In the next chapter I address the problem of what grounds induc-
tive inferences (especially inferences about social behavior); for now let 
~e point out that a game-theoretic account of norms and conventions, 
~nsofar as it describes them as equilibria of particular types of games, 
Is both inescapably static and epistemically inadequate. Not only do we 
need dynamic accounts ofhow norms and conventions emerge, but also 
a better understanding of the kinds of cognitive capabilities that allow us 
~0 recognize and project behavioral patterns as such. I will address both 
rssu · es m later chapters. 
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All we need to emphasize for the moment is that a convention is 
realized equilibrium of an original coordination game without 
Nash equilibria, and that it is in a player's self-interest to stick to it. We 
now ready to give a more precise definition of convention that 
captures its characteristic features. 
Conditions for Conventions to Exist 
A descriptive norm is a convention if there exists a sufficiently 
subset Pf £ P such that, for each individual i E Pr, the 
conditions hold: 
1. Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of 
conforms to R in situations of type Sand 
2. Sis a coordination game without nonstrict Nash equilibria. 
Recall that, for a descriptive norm to be followed, empirical "'v''"'"'''•~ 
tions [Condition 2(a)] had to be met. Hence, a convention is always 
followed descriptive norm, because empirical expectations are met 
is, the follower of a convention always expects a sufficiently large subset 
of Pto conform. Note that a descriptive norm could be a nonstrict Nash 
equilibrium; a follower could imitate a trendsetter, but the latter would 
not be interested in coordinating with the 'followers.' In the case of a 
convention, instead, there is no such indifference. 
There are several important differences between conventions and 
social norms. One is that conventions, in order to exist, have to be fol-
lowed. Social norms (and descriptive norms) instead can exist without 
being followed. Second, one conforms to a convention because of the 
belief that others behave in the expected way, because it makes sense 
to follow a convention only if there is reasonable certainty that i~ is still 
in place. Conforming to a social norm, on the contrary, require's that 
both normative and empirical expectations are met. Because conventions 
do not run counter to selfish motives, but social norms often ~do, if only 
empirical expectations were fulfilled, one would have a reason to follow a 
convention, but he would be seriously tempted not to conform to a social 
norm. In both cases, the players are playing a coordination game without 
nonstrict Nash equilibria, but whereas a convention solves an original 
coordination game, a norm transforms (with a certain probability) an 
original mixed-motive game into a coordination game and at the same 
time helps players to select one equilibrium. · 
The neat boundaries I drew between descriptive norms, conventions, 
and social norms are quite blurred in real life: Often what is a convention 
/ 
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roe is a social norm to others, and what starts as a descriptive norm 
tO SO . 
in tiroe become a stable social norm. Sometimes (but by no means 
mar £ £ . always) the passage is marked by the presence of a new pre erence or um-
sal conformity. In the trading example, the trader does not prefer that 
verry. other trader- follow that specific signaling convention. Of course, 
ev.e 'f 
she prefers that there is a signaling system, but she does not care 1 some 
traders do not follow it (provided the system is still in place). If another 
trader suddenly decides to make different signals, he is the only one to 
bear the cost of deviating from the conventional sign language. The case 
of traffic rules, the quintessential example of a convention, is quite differ-
ent. Driving according to .'personal' rules may cause severe damage. The 
reckless driver is prone to cause accidents involving other people, who 
tlms have to bear the costs of his infraction. When breaking a convention 
creates negative externalities, people prefer not just that the convention 
is in place, but also that everyone follows it. Such violations are usually 
legally sanctioned, but, even more importantly, they are also informally 
sanctioned by society. A reckless driver is blamed as irresponsible: We 
tllink he should have observed traffic rules. When breaking a coordina-
tion mechanism produces negative externalities, we may expect conven-
tions to become full social norms. 
A good example of such a transformation would be the stag-hunt game 
(Hume 1739). In this game, the hunters could coordinate their efforts 
and get a stag, which is a much bigger and valuable prey than a hare, 
which they co~ld hunt alone and get with certainty. The game can be 
represented as shown in Figure 1.10. 
If the players agree to hunt the stag together, they may get a better 
payoff (2) than hunting alone ( 1). However, even if a stag-hunting con-
vention is in place, the larger the number of hunters, the higher the 
Others 
Stag Hare 
Stag 2,2 0, 1 
Self 
Hare 1, 0 1' 1 
FIGURE 1.10. The stag-hunt game 
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probability that someone might deviate from it. The (Stag, Stag) 
rium, though Pareto dominant, is risky because, if someone deviates 
it, Self risks remaining empty-handed. The (Hare, Hare) equilibrium 
risk-dominant, because by hunting hares alone success is guarantee 
Thus, if p (Others play S) is greater or equal to 1/2, Self will 
Stag; otherwise she will choose Hare. In this case the players might 
to impose sanctions on the lone hunters, especially when the 
group is small and even a single deviation risks preventing the stag 
being successfully hunted. 'What started as a convention may thus in 
become a full social norm. 
This does not mean that a social norm is in place because it prevents 
ative externalities from occurring. Many social norms are not the oultCc)mle 
of a plan or a conscious decision to enact them; they emerge by 
action but not by human design. Some conventions may not involve 
nalities, at least initially, but they may become so well entrenched that 
ple start attaching value to them. For example, a group of people 
routinely avoid smoking before there arises a consensus disapproving 
behavior. Once a public consensus is reached, smoking incurs new 
Not only would one be expected not to smoke, but the occasional 
would incur the blame of the entire group. At this point, a social norm 
born. It may also happen that some conventions lend themselves to 
poses they did not have when they were established. Norbert Elias 
illustrated how rules of etiquette, such as proper ways to eat and 
developed to become a sign of aristocratic upbringing and reiinc~men 
and were effectively used to exclude those who did not belong to 
ruling class. Thus a thirteenth-century peasant, and even a city 
would be excused if he slurped with his spoon when in company, 
from the dish, or gnawed a bone and then put it back on the comm 
dish. It would have come as no surprise if the ill-bred blew his nose in 
tablecloth, poked his teeth with the knife, and slobbered while he 
but no nobleman was allowed such lack of manners. Definitions of"v'-«""' 
unacceptable behavior, or 'coarse manners,' were uniformly shared 
thirteenth-century writings on table manners- simultaneously 
ing in Italy, Germany, and England - that recorded for the first time 
long-standing oral tradition reflecting what was customary in society. 
standard of good behavior promoted in these works is the behavior of 
aristocracy, the courtly cir:cles gathering around the great feudal lords 
Social differences were much more important than they are today, 
29 For a definition of risk-dominance, see Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 
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theY were given unambiguous expression in social conduct. Because at 
that time eating together was a significant moment of socialization, table 
manners came to play an essential role in shaping the identity of the aris-
tocracy. A member of the ruling class was identified as such through his 
'courtesy' or good manners._Had he not respected the rules of etiquette, 
he would have been met with contempt and perceived as threatening the 
established class boundaries. 
Another example of a convention that evolved to become an impor-
tant social signaling device is footbinding in China (Mackie 1996). The 
practice of footbinding might have been invented by a dancer in the 
palace of the Southern T'ang emperor, or it may have originated among 
slave traders as a restraint on female slaves, but it soon spread to all but 
the lowest classes in the population, becoming a sign of gentility and 
modesty and an essential condition for marriage. A family that did not 
impose such painful mutilation on its female children would have come 
to signal, among other things, a dange~ous disregard for tradition and 
custom. As a consequence, it would have been ostracized and its young 
females regarded as unsuitable mates. Given enough time, what starts as a 
descriptive norm may become a stable convention. And conventions that 
prevent negative externalities, or those that come to fulfill an important 
signaling function, especially when the signal is related to social status or 
power, are easily amenable to being transformed into social norms. 
There are many rules of social interaction we usually think of as mere 
conventions but, on closer inspection, show all the characteristics of social 
norms. These rules have become so entrenched in the texture of our 
lives, so imbued with social"meanings, that we cannot ignore them with 
impunity. Everyday life is rife with implicit conventions directing the way 
we speak, walk, make eye contact, and keep a distance from other people. 
We are seldom aware of them until they are broken; however, when they 
are breached we may experience anger, outrage, and confusion. A person 
:Vho speaks too loudly, stands too close, or touches us in unexpected ways 
~s usually perceived as disturbing and offensive, if not outright frighten-
mg. Cultures differ in setting the boundaries of personal space, but once 
~ese boundaries are in place, they define 'normal' interactions, help 
In predicting others' behavior, and assign meaning to it. The rules that 
sha?e the perimeter of our personal sphere thus have an important sig-
~ahng function: We resent those who trespass these boundaries precisely 
Cecause we perceive those individuals as being hostile and threatening. 
onventions of public decorum, such as manners and etiquette, are more 
explicit but not less important because, among other things, they signal 
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respect for others and for social relationships. Breaching them can 
and bring forth retaliation. Simmel's example of the dangers of 
to greet an acquaintance on the street underscores this point: 
someone on the street proves no esteem whatever, but failure to do 
conclusively proves the opposite. The forms of courtesy fail as symbols 
positive, inner attitudes, but they are most useful in documenting "'-"'o.uvF 
ones, since even the slightest omission can radically and definitely 
our relation to a person."30 When a conventional manner of inrPr,..,.,-,.,~ 
has acquired such an important social meaning, we would rather refer 
it as a social norm. Such norms, as opposed to conventions, are 
panied by what are perceived as legitimate expectations of 
We feel almost entitled to a courteous greeting, and the annoyance 
resentment we direct against those who willingly ignore us indicate 
are in the realm of normative expectations. 
Following Social Norms 
Social norms prescribe or proscribe behavior; they entail obligations 
are supported by normative expectations. Not only do we expect others 
conform to a social norm; we are also aware that we are expected to 
form, and both these expectations are necessary reasons to comply 
the norm. Contrary to what happens with descriptive norms and rnnu.F>n-
tions, being expected (and preferred) to conform to a social norm 
also give us a sufficient reason to conform. I have mentioned fear, 
olence, and the desire to fulfill others' legitimate expectations as 
different reasons why normative expectations (and preferences) 
to conformity. Fear should never be discounted, because there are 
cases in which one obeys a norm only because neglecting others' expel:ta-
tions and preferences will bring about some form of punishment. We 
conform without attributing any intrinsic value to the norm and- · 
finding others' expectations legitimate. So~e Arab women may observe 
Muslim sexual mores, and Corsican men embrace norms of rever'rge, for 
fear of being punished if they break the rules. In both cases, they may 
find their community norms oppressive and ill-suited to modern life, but 
whoever speaks or rebels first runs the risk of bearing huge costs. Break-
ing the rules looks like the risky cooperative choice in a social dilemma. 
Freedom from a bad norm is a public good that is often very difficult to 
bring about. 
so Cf. G. Simmel (1950, p. 400). 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who conform be.cause 
ttribute some value to what the norm stands for. People vary m the theY a 
ee to which they are prepared to stand for a given norm. Some of us 
degr · · b h · l I · f · 
1 e a rule of reciprocity, ecause we see ow It 1e ps society unctiOn vau · d h dth I · · smoothly, but we would~be prepare to s e e ru e m an enVIronment 
where it is consistently violated. Others might find deep moral reasons for 
holding it even in the face of betrayals. A thirteenth-century member 
~f tiie ruling class would have refrained from blowing his nose in the 
tablecloth because that behavior was not 'courtly' or appropriate for a 
nobleman. Nowadays most of us would be ashamed at displaying such bad 
manners in front of a table companion. Even if alone, we tend to avoid this 
kind of behavior, finding it not just unsanitary but also a little demeaning. 
The negative social sanctions that may follow a transgression are usually 
reasons for compliance when a social norm is not well established. But 
later, when the norm has become a well-entrenched practice and we have 
come to attribute a certain virtue to what it prescribes, external sanctions 
seldom play a role in inducing conformity. Thus a smoker who avoids 
smoking in public places for fear of being reprimanded may in time 
come to see the merit of tliis policy and refrain from smoking in public 
places even when alone. Philosophers have pointed out that it is a fallacy 
to infer ought from is, but personal as well as historical evidence tells us 
that we are readily victims of this 'naturalistic fallacy': 'When a practice is 
well entrenched, we often come to attribute to it some intrinsic value. In 
such cases we recognize the legitimacy of others' expectations and feel 
an obligation to fulfill them. 
Neither the person who-obeys a norm because a reward or a punish-
ment is in place, nor the person who always obeys out of a deep conviction 
of the norm's merits presents us with a particular problem. Sometimes, 
however, we follow social norms even in the absence of external sanctions: 
Our choices are anonymous, and we are reasonably sure nobody is going 
to monitor us and detect behqvior that runs counter to the norm. Even 
if a choice is not strictly anonymous, there are many cases in which we 
can easily turn our backs to the situation and leave without risking any 
penalty. When we leave a tip at the diner sitting along the motorway we 
happen to be passing, we are behaving like regular customers even if this 
is the first and probably the last time we will see that waiter, so there is no 
obvious punishment or reward in place. It might be argued that in this 
case we are in the grip of personal norms and would experience guilt or 
shame were we to transgress our self-imposed rules. If this were the case, 
We should observe consistent compliance with a tipping norm in a variety 
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of circumstances, but often the same individual who is ready to leave a tip 
at the diner may not do so when in a foreign country, even in those cases 
in which the 'service included' clause is not present. The same incon-
stancy we encounter with tipping may occur with respect to much more 
important social norms, such as those regulating fair division or recipro-
cation. People who reciprocate on one occasion may avoid reciprocating 
on others without apparent reason. I am not referring here to cases in 
which it is acceptable to transgress a norm.31 For almost every norm one 
can think of, there are socially acceptable exceptions to it. Thus I am nor-
mally expected to return favors, but an intervening hardship may excuse 
me; similarly, many would deem it inappropriate to return a favor that 
was not requested and looks like a veiled bribe; The cases of interest are 
rather those in which one is expected to adhere to a norm and does not, 
but we have evidence that on other, similar occasions, the same person 
complied with the norm even in the absence of any obvious sanction. 
I am interested in explaining such apparent inconsistencies across ·and 
within individuals. 
The brief taxonomy of norms I have proposed is of some help here, 
because what is baffling is not inconsistency in following a descriptive 
norm or a convention, but the inconsistency we experience with regard 
to social norms. For example, when a coordinating convention is in place, 
it is in everybody's interest to follow it, and when we observe inconsistent 
behavior we are likely to attribute it either to a misunderstanding of the 
situation or to poor learning about how and when to follow the conven-
tion. Whenever I go back to England, I have to pay special attention the 
first few days I drive a car, because driving on the left side of the road feels 
unnatural. If I were tired or absentminded, I would be prone to make 
a dangerous mistake. Since expectations play such an important r0le 
in supporting conventions - as well as descriptive norms - a change in 
expectations (of others' conformity) may be another reason why we stop 
follo'Aing a convention we observed until now. We may subsequently real-
ize it was a mistake, because the convention is still followed, and reve'h to 
the old behavior. Alternatively, when a new convention is in place we are 
more likely to fluctuate in compliance. Dress codes are a good example. 
It is now customary in many American companies to have a day (usually 
Friday) of "business casual" dressing. Many friends reported embarrass-
ing situations in which they were the only ones in jeans and sneakers, only 
31 Even criminal law recognizes mitigating circumstances such as duress, coercion, insanity, 
and accident. ) 
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to realize that the following Friday, when they reverted to dressier suits, 
rnore coworkers had adopted the "dress down" code. It usually takes some 
time to stabilize on a common dress code, and in the meantime behavior 
can be quite hectic. 
The case of social-norms. is more complex. Norms are sometimes stated 
in vague and general terms and operate in the presence of areas of inde-
terminacy and ambiguity. Several norms may apply to the same situation, 
or it may not be clear which norms have a bearing in a given case. When-
ever it is unclear which norm applies to a given situation, we may of 
course expect irregular behavior, as the former example of tipping in 
a foreign country illustrates. Variance is also to be expected (or at least 
it is explainable) when sanctions have been introduced or removed or, 
for some reason, there has been a change in expectations. With fairness 
and reciprocity norms, it is often in one's interest to break the norm, to 
yield to temptation. vVhy should I accept a fair division ifi have the upper 
hand and, moreover, I will not interact with my partner in the future? Why 
should I reciprocate my neighbor's favors if I am moving to a different 
town soon? My sudden transformation can be altogether explained by 
self-interest, boosted by a change in sanctions and expectations. Another 
possible reason for inconsistent behavior is weakness of the will. When-
ever the temptation is too great, the bait too alluring, I may break a norm 
that I othenvise approve of and regularly obey. 
Yet, if no such reason is apparent and we know that a person (a) 
approves of a given norm and (b) has conformed to it on other, similar 
occasions, we could either conclude that norms' influence on behavior 
has been overstated or that we need a better understanding of the role 
of situational cues in inducing conformity. Indeed, factors having noth-
ing to do with the norm in question- including other norms, attitudes, 
or environmental factors - may attenuate or emphasize its impact on 
actions. Environmental stimuli in particular have been reported by psy-
chologists to cause major changes in the kinds of behaviors, such as the 
propensity to help other people, that we usually expect to manifest a 
certain consistency and that are taken to signal a character disposition. 
Several studies of helping behavior indicate that people are more likely 
to help others if they are in a familiar environment, or if the request 
comes from a female. When facing emergencies, people are much more 
likely to intervene if they are alone. The presence of other bystanders 
to an accident seems to consistently dampen altruistic ardor (Latane 
~nd Darley 1968). Similarly, we have no indication of a general disposi-
tion to take normative considerations as overriding, or of an unfailing 
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inclination to obey a norm whenever a norm is in place. Quite to 
contrary, all the evidence we have points to situational factors as 
a significant influence on behavior. However, as much as situational 
tors may attenuate the impact of norms on behavior, the opposite is 
true: Situational factors may increase the effect of norms on behavior 
making a norm salient. Unfortunately, there are no experiments 
personal (as opposed to interpersonal) variations in behavior in 
situations, where the experimenter slightly varies the environment or 
description of the situation. In the following chapters, I will present 
indirect evidence that supports the hypothesis that situational 
are extremely important in focusing actors on social norms, thus mciuc:m~ 
or preventing conformity. 
Awareness and Choice 
In the next chapters, the idea tliat norms influence behavior only 
they are salient or focal for the individual at the time of behavior will 
expanded on and put to the test. If people are not strongly focused 
a norm, I shall argue, even strong personal norms are not predictive 
relevant behavior. Normative focus, in turn, is enhanced or mitigated 
situational cues that draw attention to (or distract attention from) a 
vant norm. There is by now a large database of experimental results 
Trust, Ultimatum, and Social Dilemma games, in which small 
in the environment or the way in which the game is presented 
major behavioral changes. Individuals may be cooperative on some 
sions and selfish in others, give generously or reciprocate at times and 
'mean' at other times. If a fairness norm is activated in condition x, 
the game is one-shot and the players anonymous, why is it not .,.cuv;uc::u 
in the slightly different condition y, in a similar one-shot, 
encounter? Because the apparently inconsistent behaviors are not 
lated with the presence or absence of sanctions, this variability has 
several authors to discount the importance of norms as explan~tory 
abies in such experiments (Dawes et al. 1977). The reasoning J.IOa'uuJ.5 
to this conclusion is that - if a person were to uphold a norm -
that person would conform to it in all circumstances to which the nann 
applies. This belief presupposes that (a) we are always aware.of our 
sonal standards and ready to act on them, and (b) situational factors 
no influence on our behavioral dispositions. Because I will focus next on 
situational factors and their influence, I will now restrict my attention 
the issue ofnormativity and choice. For example, when situational ~"•-•v••~· 
! 
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are paramount, in the sense that their presence is crucial in priming a 
110
nn, does it make sense to say that a person chooses to follow a norm? If 
one is unaware of the stimuli and the cognitive process whose outcome 
is norm-congruent behavior, can we still claim that it is rational to follow 
that norm? 
When mentioning the expectations and preferences that support con-
fonnity to a social norm, I referred to reasons for following a norm, and 
having reasons can be interpreted as mentally referring to a norm before 
acting, having intentions, and making a reasoned (and rational) choice. 
For example, we may say that the trader who uses the conventional sig-
naling system is making a rational choice, because we assume she wants 
to communicate and, through communication, reach her goal of buy-
ing and selling shares. There is a difference, though, between choosing 
rationally and choosing a course of action because it is the rational thing 
to do. In light of the coordinating role played by the trading-signaling 
system, and assuming the trader's goal is to make trades, we judge the 
trader's choice to be rational, but the trader herself may have been totally 
unaware of having a choice. In this case, what has been activated is not 
the deliberational route to behavior but rather the heuristic one. The 
trader may have never thought about the signaling convention being a 
coordinating device, nor might she be aware of any goal or plan that 
following the convention helps her to achieve. This, I must add, is a 
common experience; frequently we do not think much before acting, in 
the sense that our behavior does not consciously follow from intentions 
or plans and is carried out without awareness or attention. To engage 
in thoughtful processes, we must be sufficiently motivated: The situa-
tion must have high personal relevance, our action must have important 
consequences, we are held responsible for our choice, or there is some 
challenge present. As opposed to this thoughtful evaluation of pros and 
cons, we usually engage in a more rapid, heuristic form of processing. 
The trader uses the signaling convention as a default, without a thought 
to the benefits her behavior yields. 
Even obeying a social norm can be, though by no means has to be, 
a~ entirely automatic affair. We are, so to speak, in the grip of the situ-
atiOn that primed the norm and are following it through the heuristic 
:oute. Those individuals who cooperate in the initial stages of an exper-
rrnental, finitely repeated public good game do not seem to have gone 
through a mental process in which they calculated the costs and benefits 
of being nice. Indeed, a simple calculation of costs and benefits might 
have induced them to defect immediately, as game theory predicts they 
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will do. On the other hand, these people are not dupes: 
precipitously decays whenever people realize they have been cheated 
others (Dawes and Thaler 1988; F ehr and Gachter 2000b). My hVllOthe:;i~ 
is that subjects in experiments act like any of us would in a new 
and use social norms as defaults, at least initially. If not challenged, 
.cooperative norm is adopted in all those situations in which it is 
focal. If, however, the norm is violated often enough to be noticed, 
will stop following it, at least in that situation. Recall that my definition 
social norms entails that an individual needs to have conditional 
ences and the right kind of expectations in order to follow a norm. 
potential norm follower was represented as facing a Bayesian game. If 
initially assesses a higher probability to being matched with another 
follower, he will behave cooperatively. But he will revert to defecting if 
realizes his expectations are not met. I am not claiming here that mine 
a realistic model of how we reason, but, as will be made plain in the 
lowing chapters, I maintain it is a fairly good explanatory and pre 
model, because my definitions are operational and their 
are testable. Furthermore, the fuct that we are not aware of our 
processes does not mean that the beliefs and preferences that 
the choice to conform have no existence. On many occasions our 
scious awareness of a norm, and of the expectations and preferences 
trigger conformity, is only brought about by the realization that the 
has been violated. 
Suppose you are one of the nice guys who choose to cooperate in 
finitely repeated public good game. When asked to explain your 
io!", you may offer a rational justification and refer to the choice to obey 
norm: You may say that you would really feel guilty not to give it 
and signal your good intentions. Or you may say that being CO()O(!raluve 
is a good rule, and that it is better, in the long run, than being a 
and therefore you are committed to it even on those occasions in 
you may cheat with impunity. Your rational justification is part qf a 
tive, an acceptable account of why we act as we do. Cognitive PS"¥CllO!Og1SUi. 
tell us that we often have little direct introspective awareness or 
to our higher level cognitive processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). 32 
may be unaware that certain stimuli influence our responses, or we 
even be unaware of the existence of stimuli that have a ~ausal effect 
our responses. Yet when questioned about our choices, judgments, 
32 A high-order cognitive process mediates the effects of a stimulus on a complex 
such as judgment, inference, problem solving, and choice. 
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luations, we are usually quite articulate in offering credible reasons. 
~va Iausible explanation is that our reports are based on implicit theo-
. p about the causal connection between stimulus and response. The nes 
causal theory we put forth may happen to be an accurate account of what 
stimulus was influentiaJjn_producing our response, but accuracy, accord-
iilg to Nisbett and Wilson, is not synonymous with awareness. We may 
accurately report that a particular stimulus was influential in producing 
a behavioral response because the stimulus is available and salient, and it 
appears to be a pla~~ible cause, not because we ~ave a p~vileged ~ccess 
to our higher cogn1t1ve processes. If the actual stimulus 1s not available, 
salieilt, or not deemed to be a plausible cause of the response, it will 
d. d . fl . 133 regularly be 1scounte as umn uentla. 
Latane and Darley's (1968) experiments on helping behavior offer 
a disturbing example of how choices may be influenced by factors that 
are outside our immediate awareness. Their subjects were progressively 
more unlikely to help somebody in distress as the number of bystanders 
increased, but they were entirely unaware of the effect that the pres-
ence of other people had on their behavior. Moreover, when the exper-
iments were described in detail to different, nonparticipating subjects, 
who were then asked to predict how others (and perhaps themselves) 
would behave in similar circumstances, they concurred that the presence 
of other people would have no effect on helping behavior. In this as well 
as other similar experiments, the congruence between the participants' 
reports and the predictions made by nonparticipants suggests that both 
are drawn from a similar source. Nisbett and Wilson explain the con-
gruence by referring to common, shared causal theories that make both 
actor and observer 'perceive' co variations between particular stimuli and 
responses. 34 
Some of our reports may instead be highly accurate, as when we apply 
the sequential steps of a ·decision process we have learned. A business 
school graduate who is making the decision. whether to buy a particular 
stock, for example, w:ill apply learned rules for evaluating the stock and 
Weighing all the factors that have a bearing on its price. Her report on 
33 
:ve are usually blind to contextual factors, as well as to position, serial order, and anchor-
Ing effects. Most people would think it is outrageous that the choices they make might 
be influenced by such irrelevant factors as the position (say, from left to right) of the 
34 
object chosen. 
The criterion for awareness proposed is a "verbal report which exceeds in accuracy 
that obtained from observers provided with a general description of the stimulus and 
response in question" (Nisbett and Wilson 1977, p. 251). 
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her final choice will accurately list the weighted factors as reasons for 
choice. Similarly, we might be fairly accurate about the weights we 
to various factors in deciding what a fair division of a particular 
should be. But this may happen because our culture (or 
specifies rather dearly which factors should count in such a ......... ._.,,,'"'''' 
Still, being able to describe the evaluative criteria one has applied is 
evidence of direct access to one's mental evaluation process. 
The existence of a norm and of reasons for conformity might 
be correctly reported as an explanation for our behavior, even if we 
unaware of the complex mental process that resulted in that 
Situational dependency can in turn be understood in two different 
One is that the environment or situation we are in provides nP·rr.Pnh 
stimuli to which we respond in an 'automatic,' unreflective way. Ex 
we may or may not accurately report on the importance of t~e 
uli, depending on whether they are available and how plausible 
are as causal factors. Alternatively, we may see the situation as 
encing the way in which we consciously interpret and understand 
surroundings. A norm in this case can be made salient by particular 
uational cues, but we still choose to follow it, that is, consider alt.•r'Tl-::~tm ... < 
and make mental reference to the norm before we act. I believe 
accounts of situational dependency to be valid, depending on the 
of awareness we experience at any given time. There are occasions 
which we are unaware of the reasons why we do what we do, and 
sions in which we are consciously thinking of a norm, and the ... .,.~.c.-...n. 
for following it, before acting. 35 Also in this second case, though, 
should not confuse access to our private store of knowledge, , 
or plans with access to our cognitive processes, which are opaque 
introspection. 36 
Lack of awareness should not be equated with lack of rationality. It 
possible to maintain that it is rational to follow a norm, even i:!l for 
most part our subjective experience of conformity to a norm is 
35 A mental state is conscious when it is accompanied by a roughly simultaneous, 
order thought about that very mental state. For example, a conscious experience 
pain involves more than the simple registering of a painful sensatjon in the mind. 
also includes a realization that one is having this sensation, a thought that "I am 
pain." 
36 Jones and Nisbett (1972) distinguish between content and process. Content includes all 
sorts of private knowledge we possess: We know personal historical facts, our focus 
attention at any given time, what we feel and sense, our evaluations, and our plans. They 
convincingly maintain that we have introspective access to content but not to mental 
processes. 
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tional calculation. Compliance may look like a habit, thoughtless and 
::wmatic, or it may be guided by feelings of anxiety at the thought of 
hat might happen if one violates the norm. Yet conformity to a norm may 
:e rational, and may be explained by the agents' beliefs and desires, even 
though one does not-conform out of a conscious rational calculation. 
As David Lewis himself pointed out in his analysis of habits, a habit may 
be under an agent's rational control in the following sense: If that habit 
ever ceased to serve the agent's desires according to his beliefs, it would 
at once be overridden and abandoned.37 Similarly, an explanation in 
terms of norms does not compete with one in terms of expectations 
and preferences, because a no.rm persists precisely because of certain 
expectations and preferences: If I ever wanted to be different, or if I 
expected others to do something different, I would probably overcome 
the force of the norm. 
We may conclude that awareness is not a necessary condition for being 
rational, in the sense that, even if unaware, we may still act according 
to our beliefs and desires. To maintain that following a norm can be 
described, at least in principle, in terms of beliefs and desires and hence 
as a (practically) rational choice allows us to think of norms as a spe-
cial kind of unintended collective outcome of individual choices.38 Such 
outcomes have desirable properties, for example, they are equilibria of 
coordination games. Note that being an equilibrium does not make a 
social norm good or efficient; there are lots of bad equilibria around. 
It simply means that the expectations and actions of all the parties con-
cerned are consistent, or that their expectations are self-fulfilling. This 
raises the important question of how such consistency comes about, but 
we will discuss this later. Another important advantage of defining norms 
in terms of beliefs and preferences is that we are providing an operational 
definition of what a norm is. This is important in experimental studies, 
where we want to assess whether the behavior we observe is due to the 
presence of norms or to something else. Ifwe know that norms are only 
followed if certain expectations exist, then it is possible to verify if indeed 
people have those expectations, or to manipulate them in order to see 
whether their behavior changes in predictable ways. 
37 D L . 
38 • eMS, 1975, P· 25. 
It is important to distinguish between practical and epistiJillic rationality (Bicchieri 1993). 
Practical rationality is the rationality of an action, given the agent's goal and beliefs. Thus 
goals may be unrealistic and beliefs false, and an action still may be practically rational. 
Conversely, epistemic rationality is the rationality of the beliefs we hold. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
In this short appendix I introduce a general utility function based 
norms. Consider a typical n-person (normal-form) game. For ease of 
mal treatment, think of a norm as a function that maps one's expe.ctation: 
concerning the behavior of others into what one "ought to do." In 
words, a norm regulates behavior conditional on other people's ~~· .. ~·· •v1 
Denote the strategy set of player i by S;, and let S_; = il_¥; S1 be 
set of strategy profiles of players other than i. Then a norm for player 
is formally represented by a function N;: L;-+ S;, where L_; s; S_;.39 
an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, for example, a shared ·norm 
be to cooperate. In that case, L; includes all the strategies of all 
(excluding player z) that prescribe cooperation. 
Two features of this definition are worth noting. First, given the 
players' strategies, there may or may not be a norm that prescribes 
player i ought to behave. So L_; need not be, and usually is not, equal 
S_;. In particular, L_; could be empty in the situation where there is no 
norm whatsoever to regulate player i's behavior. Second, there could 
norms that regulate joint behaviors. A norm, for example, that 
the joint behaviors of players i and j may be represented by N;,i L-i.-j-+ 
S; x ~. where L-i,-j is the set of strategies adopted by all players 
than i and j. Because I am primarily concerned with two-person games, 
will not further complicate the model in that direction. 
A strategy profiles = (sJ, .. . , sn) instantiates a norm for jif LJ E L_1, 
that is, if Nj is defined at S-J· It violates a norm if, for some j, it instantiates 
a norm for jbut si f. Nj(s-J). Let:rr; be the payoff function ofplay,~r i. The 
norm-based utility function of player i depends on the strategy profile s 
and is given by 
where k; 2: 0 is a constant representing a player's sensitivity to the relevant 
norm.40 The first maximum operator takes care of the possibility that the 
norm instantiation (and violation) might be ambiguous, in the sense that 
a strategy profile instantiates a norm for several players sipmltaneously. 
However, this situation never occurs in my examples, so the first maximum 
39 Note that N need not be deterministic. As we shall see in Chapter 3, when we look at 
Ultimatum games, N can also be a random variable. 
40 k; is only unique up to some positive factor that varies according to the players' payoff 
functions. 
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tor degenerates. The second maximum operator ranges over all 
opera I · d th d' · e layers other than the norm violator. In p am wor .s. e IS~ountmg 
th P (multiplied by k;) is the maximum payoff deductiOn resultmg from 
term 
all norm violations. . . . . 
Ai an example _ _to illustrate the above norm-based utihty func~on, 
'der the Prisoner's Dilemma, where each player has two possible const . 
gies· C (Cooperate) and D (Defect). The norm-based function for strate · . . . 
either player is defined at C and undefined at D. The utility function for 
player 1 is then the following: 
UI( C, C) = :rr1 ( C, C) - k1 (:rr1 ( C, C) - :rri( C, C)) = :rr1 ( C, C) 
U1 (D, D) = n1 (D, D) - k1 (n1 (D, D) n1 (D, D)) = n1 (D, D) 
U1 ( C, D) = :rr1 ( C, D) - k1 (:rrd C, C) :rr1 ( C, D)) 
U1 (D, C) = n1 (D, C)- k1 (n2(C, C)- n2(D, C)). 
Player 2's utility function is similar. The game turns out to be a coordina-
tion game with two equilibria when U1 (D, C) < lh ( C, C) and U2 ( C, D) < 
~(C, C), that is, when41 
n1 (D, C) - :rr1 ( C, C) 
k! > )' n2(C, C)- :rr2(D, C 
n2(C, D)- :rr2(C, C) 
k2 > . 
:rr1 ( C, C) - :rr1 ( C, D) 
Otherwise it remains a PD game. 
As an example, take the PD game in Figure 1.1 and assume the players' 
payoffs are as follows: 
Other Other 
c D c D 
c 2,2 0,4 c 2,2 -4,0 
Self Self 
D 4,0 1, 1 D 0,-4 1' 1 
I PDGame I 
Figure 1.1 I 
Coordination Game 
\ Figure 1.6 
41 Note that u1 (D,C) stands for the utility of player 1 when 1 plays D and 2 plays C. Analo-
gously, U2(D,C) stands for the utility of player 2 when 1 plays Dand 2 plays C. 
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In this case, 1r ( C, C) = 2 and 1r (D, D) 1. 
However, 
and 
lft (D, C)= 4 
1r1 (D, C)} 
1r2(D, C) = 4- k1 (2); 
similar calculations hold for player 2. 
For both players to prefer to cooperate with each other, it must be that 
both k1 and ~ are greater than 1. For example, if we assume that, say, 
both k1 and ~ are equal to 2, we obtain the above coordination game 
(Figure 1.6). Note that it is not necessary to assume that k1 and ~ are 
the same. In fact, players may have different degrees of 'sensitivity' to a 
norm. Being 'sensitive' to a norm simply means that one dislikes being 
the victim of a norm violation as well as being the transgressor. We may . 
thus say that k defines different types of players. In our simple example, 
there can be only two types of players: Either a player's kis greater than 1,. 
or it is equal to or less than 1. 
In this case, player i (with k; > 1) is rational iff she chooses a strategy s; 
such that the expected utility EU(s;) ::::, EU(s/) for all s/ ::j s; E S;, cal-
culated with respect to the probability that (k1 > 1). It is important to 
remember that when a player is faced with a PD game and has no infor-
mation about the identity or past actions of the other player, she will 
rationally choose to 'follow the cooperative norm' if two conditions are 
satisfied. She must be a potential norm-follower (i.e., her kmust be greater 
than 1) and she must believe that the other player's k-value is such that it 
makes him sensitive to the norm (in our example, it must also be greater 
than 1). In other words, a norm-follower fuced with a PD game will have 
to assess the probability that the other player is the norm-following type. 
In our case, if p(~ > 1) > 1/2, player 1 will choose to cooperate. 
